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ABSTRACT  
   
Cyber threats are growing in number and sophistication making it important to 
continually study and improve all dimensions of cyber defense. Human teamwork in 
cyber defense analysis has been overlooked even though it has been identified as an 
important predictor of cyber defense performance. Also, to detect advanced forms of 
threats effective information sharing and collaboration between the cyber defense 
analysts becomes imperative. Therefore, through this dissertation work, I took a cognitive 
engineering approach to investigate and improve cyber defense teamwork. The approach 
involved investigating a plausible team-level bias called the information pooling bias in 
cyber defense analyst teams conducting the detection task that is part of forensics 
analysis through human-in-the-loop experimentation. The approach also involved 
developing agent-based models based on the experimental results to explore the cognitive 
underpinnings of this bias in human analysts. A prototype collaborative visualization tool 
was developed by considering the plausible cognitive limitations contributing to the bias 
to investigate whether a cognitive engineering-driven visualization tool can help mitigate 
the bias in comparison to off-the-shelf tools. It was found that participant teams 
conducting the collaborative detection tasks as part of forensics analysis, experience the 
information pooling bias affecting their performance.  Results indicate that cognitive 
friendly visualizations can help mitigate the effect of this bias in cyber defense analysts. 
Agent-based modeling produced insights on internal cognitive processes that might be 
contributing to this bias which could be leveraged in building future visualizations. This 
work has multiple implications including the development of new knowledge about the 
science of cyber defense teamwork, a demonstration of the advantage of developing tools 
  ii 
using a cognitive engineering approach, a demonstration of the advantage of using a 
hybrid cognitive engineering methodology to study teams in general and finally, a 
demonstration of the effect of effective teamwork on cyber defense performance. 
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Cyber threats are growing in number and sophistication. Cyber warfare is 
becoming a reality. Therefore, it is important to continually study and improve all 
dimensions of cyber defense. Although recent research has turned attention towards the 
human element of cyber defense, there is still considerably less emphasis on 
understanding teamwork in cyber defense. Through this dissertation, I investigated team 
cognition in cyber defense analysts, performing a threat detection task, using experiments 
involving human subjects and agent-based modeling. The information pooling bias is the 
specific team-level issue that will be addressed through this dissertation work. 
Most organizations, small or large, now rely on computers and computer 
networks for their daily operations. These networks could include devices ranging from 
less critical personal computers to highly critical data servers and sometimes to even 
more critical nuclear and power control systems. A study conducted by the Ponemon 
institute and sponsored by HP (Ponemon Institute, 2013) reveals that there was a 78 
percent increase in cybercrime cost from 2009 and that the average number of successful 
attacks per organization per week has risen to 122 from 102 attacks per week in 2012. 
This report also points out that the sophistication of attacks has grown because the 
adversaries now rely on intelligence to obtain sensitive data and to disrupt the services. 
Hence effective cyber defense capability becomes critical for any organization to protect 
against the growing number of cyber attacks. Towards this end, there is a sudden surge in 
demand from organizations across the globe for advanced tools, new services and 
additional personnel to solidify their cyber defense capabilities. However, simply adding 
more personnel and tools to the cyber security system does not automatically translate to 
better security, but instead could be detrimental to the existing system.  
2 
Cyber defense can be conceptualized as a complex socio-technical system 
comprised of many human and technological components working together on different 
parts of the task. Humans and their technology counterparts have to work together 
effectively to maintain the security stature of an organization. Therefore, a critical 
investigation into the social and cognitive aspects of the human analysts, along with 
investigation into the human systems integration aspects of the task is essential. 
Cyber attacks have evolved from traditional isolated Denial of Service (DOS) and 
malware type attacks often launched by a single independent entity or a small group of 
hackers to coordinated large scale attacks by state sponsored organizations using stealth 
modes and advanced persistent threat (APT) types of attacks. Advanced persistent threat 
is a target-oriented and long-term attack (Liu, Chen, & Lin, 2013) in which attackers use 
customized malware and bot machines to gain control of network boundary systems in an 
organization. They use such systems as entry points to navigate by using multi-step 
attacks, reaching the specific information or system in a large enterprise network. The 
attackers using APT are very target centric, persistent and spend all of their time and 
effort to obtain the intended target information or system and hence the name advanced 
persistent threat. Such kinds of attacks involve social engineering, coordination among 
multiple individuals attacking multiple network entry points to gain access, attacking 
different parts of the network, and also happening over a long period of time at a snail’s 
pace to avoid detection. It is common that such targeted attacks go unnoticed for several 
months.  
A recent example of APT is the attack on the Target Corporation in which credit 
card and debit card information from millions of customers was stolen. It was a planned 
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attack in which the hackers prepared extensively and used techniques such as social 
engineering to accomplish spear phishing and insertion of malware in the Point of Sale 
(POS) terminal to steal the information. The corporation’s network was in the 
compromised status for a long time, but still it went unnoticed. The individual pieces of 
such a large scale sophisticated attack would seem like isolated events or even seem like 
benign activity happening across the different parts of a network and happening at 
different points in time and therefore tend not to generate suspicion. However, when all 
the individual observations or pieces of evidence are put together they would indicate an 
attack and hence could be detected early on before severe damage is done to the 
infrastructure and information.  
To detect such kinds of sophisticated attacks, effective and timely knowledge 
sharing through collaboration among cyber defense analysts becomes essential because 
the clues needed to detect the attack are spread across many networks, across different 
points in time, across shifts and across different analysts and system owners. Cyber 
experts often talk about improving communication about new threats and collaborative 
response between organizations and between organizations and the government and even 
on improving communication between different kinds of software products used in cyber 
defense. But what seems to be overlooked is the fact that the key amidst all these 
components are the human analysts who are conducting cyber defense. Investigating how 
the team of cyber defense analysts interact and collaborate can provide insights on their 
limitations and cognitive biases which in turn can lead to finding ways to mitigate them, 
thereby improving their overall efficiency.  
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The personnel conducting cyber defense tasks are named differently in each 
organization. Therefore, in this paper, I will be referring to them as cyber defense 
analysts or simply analysts. The analyst could be an employee of the same company or 
could be an employee of a company that is providing security services to other 
companies. The cyber defense analysis task involves high uncertainty, high information 
load, cyber attacks evolving at very high speeds (P. Liu, 2009), and thus little time for an 
analyst to detect and respond to an attack (Champion, Rajivan, Cooke, & Jariwala, 2012). 
Analysts are often placed under extreme time pressure. In some settings, they have to 
process the alerts given to them at a pace of one every two minutes. Thus, a combination 
of factors that include overwhelming amounts of data, numerous false alarms, and time 
stress leads to cognitive overload in cyber defense analysts (Champion et al., 2012). 
Because cyber defense analysis is a complex task, it is often performed by analysts as a 
group, with each analyst working on a different level of the task with specific domain 
knowledge and experience. However, simply bringing a group of people together to work 
on a task would not suffice. To work on such complex tasks we need effective teams of 
cyber defense analysts. Cyber defense analyst teams are in many cases, loose associations 
of individuals, rather than functioning and effective teams (Champion et al., 2012). For 
our definition, a team is a type of a group in which members of the team have diverse 
backgrounds, but work together in an interdependent manner towards a common goal 
(Salas, Dickinson, Converse, & Tannenbaum, 1992).  
Cyber defense analyst groups display minimal teamwork (Champion et al., 2012) 
due to cognitive load, lack of motivation, time crunch and also due to institutional 
policies on employee rewards for cyber defense analysts. Analysts are often rewarded 
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though bonuses and employment advancement based on the number of critical attacks or 
intrusions they detect as an individual. Thus, a notion of “Knowledge is Power” is 
prevalent in the cyber defense community which inhibits analysts from sharing 
information with their peers in anticipation that they might use that information in the 
future for detecting attacks. This hampers information flow and communication among 
the analysts. Therefore, improving teamwork would likely reduce the cognitive overload 
and stress in analysts, improve information flow and communication, and in turn, 
improve the overall performance of the analysts. 
The most common cyber defense analyst roles are (1) triage analysts or detectors 
and (2) senior analysts or responders and (3) forensics analysts.  As the role name 
indicates, triage analysts scan the network for intrusion alerts generated from IDS 
(Intrusion Detection System) sensors to identify the suspicious alerts and reject the false 
alerts. They then filter associated data pertinent to those suspicious sets of alerts to 
analyze the data and to decide whether the alerts could actually correspond to an attack. 
The analysts eventually report their findings to their senior analysts (D’Amico, Whitley, 
Tesone, OBrien, & Roth, 2005). The reports are peer reviewed before being passed on to 
the senior analyst. The senior analyst collects these reports and correlates them to 
determine if there is an attack incident ongoing at a larger level to take the appropriate 
response (DAmico et al., 2005). The forensics analyst analyzes attack evidence from a 
longer time period to detect whether the attack evidence correlates to a larger story and 
whether those evidences also indicates an emerging threat. As described, the cyber 
defense analysis task is structured loosely in a layered manner in which analysts in one 
layer feed the analysts in the layer above them with attack pertinent reports for further 
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processing. Therefore, the quality of decisions made by the analysts working at higher 
levels of the task depends on the quality of the reports from the analysts working at the 
lower levels of the task.  
Cyber defense analysts currently use e-mail and traditional chat systems as 
software tools to communicate with each other. They use wikis or generic document 
sharing tools to collaborate and share their findings. In some organizations, they even use 
software bug ticketing systems to report the intrusion and attack incidents by raising 
tickets which then get assigned to various personnel to take appropriate response. There 
is a lack of well-integrated, custom made, collaboration and reporting tools to assist cyber 
defense analysts even though effective collaboration is an important component for such 
critical tasks. The developmental focus in the cyber domain has been predominantly on 
developing detection tools and visualization tools that will assist in fusing information 
from multiple sources. Through this work I examine the impact of such a collaboration 
tool in improving information sharing among the analysts and their detection 
performance.  
To summarize, cyber attacks are growing in number and sophistication and the 
cyber defense analysts who are designated to protect our organizations from these attacks 
are cognitively overloaded and do not work as a team. With growing attack sophistication 
(such as advanced persistent threats) there is a need for timely information and 
knowledge sharing, but there is a lack of institutional policies, training and tools that 
promote team work. Cyber defense is loosely structured as a hierarchical process and 
reports from low level analysts conducting detection tasks determine the overall security 
stature of an organization. Therefore in this thesis team processes in cyber defense 
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analyst teams conducting the forensics task are investigated using human-in-the-loop 
experiments and agent-based modeling. A prototype of collaboration and reporting 
software to assist cyber defense analysts in collaborating and sharing knowledge 
effectively with other analysts is developed and tested. 
In the next section the literature on team cognition and information sharing is 
reviewed followed by a discussion of team cognition of cyber defense analysts. Research 
questions derived from the literature reviewed and past work are presented and a two-part 
methodology to address them is described.  First a human-in-the-loop experiment is 
conducted. Second an agent based model is developed and used to simulate information 
sharing among analysts under different models of in-the-head search process. This is 
followed by a comparison of the experimental results and results from the model 













 In this section background on theories and perspectives of team cognition and 
specific team processes such as communication and team situation awareness are 
discussed as they are relevant to investigate teamwork among cyber defense analysts 
from a cognitive stand point. Because human factors based research in the cyber domain 
is nascent, the literature is reviewed from a related field: intelligence analysis, to identify 
the types of cognitive limitations and biases that operators face in such domains 
especially at the team level. Then the literature is reviewed on one such bias assumed to 
be relevant to cyber defense analyst teams conducting the detection task as part of 
forensics analysis: information pooling. The hidden profiles paradigm and the methods 
used in the past to investigate the information pooling bias are also reviewed. 
 Because agent-based models are applied in this thesis to extend the human-in-the-
loop experiments and to study research questions that are difficult to study in the lab, the 
field of cognitive modeling is introduced along with a discussion of the limitations of 
existing cognitive modeling methods. Literature on agent-based models which have been 
predominantly used to study social systems is also reviewed, as well as other related 
organization and group modeling methodologies such as social network models. Finally, 
as a background for development of a collaborative tool, the literature on computer 
supported collaborative work (CSCW) and CSCW in cyber security is reviewed. 
Team Cognition 
Team cognition is defined as cognitive processes such as decision making and 
learning occurring at the team level (Salas, Cooke, & Rosen, 2008). Team cognition has a 
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significant effect on team performance (Cannon‐Bowers & Salas, 2001; Cooke, Gorman, 
& Winner, 2007). The Iranian Airbus tragedy of 1988 in which a commercial flight full 
of passengers was mistakenly shot down by USS Vincennes (Collyer & Malecki, 1998) is 
a classic example of the effects of poor team cognition. The three major theoretical 
perspectives used for explaining team cognition are: shared cognition or shared mental 
models, transactive memory, and interactive team cognition.  
Shared Cognition 
The shared cognition or shared mental models view has been around for more 
than two decades and is the most widely adopted approach used to explain team cognition 
(Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1993; Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994). It adopts the concept of 
mental models (individual) and extends it to explain cognition in teams. Mental models 
can be defined as “mechanisms whereby humans are able to generate descriptions of 
system purpose and form explanations of system functioning and observed system states, 
and predictions of future system states” (Rouse & Morris, 1986), p. 7). Cannon-Bowers, 
Salas, and Converse (1990) first developed the concept of team mental models based on 
their study of expert teams: “When we observe expert, high performance teams in action, 
it is clear they can often coordinate their behavior without the need to communicate” 
(Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 2001) p. 196). Shared cognition (Cannon-Bowers 
et al., 2001; Cannon‐Bowers & Salas, 2001) theory suggests that team performance is 
dependent on the degree to which the knowledge and understanding of the task and the 
situation is similar across the members of the team. In simple terms it requires the 
members of the team to be on the same page. This shared cognition model is often 
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critiqued for its simplistic view of team cognition given that it is unlikely that all 
individuals have identical knowledge structures (Cooke et al., 2007) 
Transactive Memory  
In everyday life, we often use memory systems outside of our own minds (i.e., 
calendars, notes and directories ) to remember things such as meeting times and phone 
numbers. This is because, as humans, we have constraints on how much we can 
remember. Miller (1956) showed that there is a limit to how much information we can 
record in our working memory and that we can only hold up to seven plus or minus two 
chunks of information. Individual chunks could be a single letter, a group of letters, a 
word, a number and so forth depending on how an individual group’s the information 
received. However, later studies have disputed the magical number seven proposed by 
Miller, but still endorse the fact that there is a limit to working memory (Cowan, 1988; 
Cowan, 2001). 
To formalize this type of memory which is distributed across individuals and 
systems, Wegner (1987) introduced “transactive memory”. Transactive memory is related 
to shared cognition theory (Hollingshead, 1998), where each individual in a group is 
considered a memory system holding distinct information and knowledge along with the 
awareness of what others in the group know. Transactive memory is similar to external 
memory, but instead of remembering to look at book for a certain information, we just 
remember that our teammate is an expert on a topic and that asking him or her will give 
us the same information, yet perhaps more quickly and accurately. Interaction and 
communication are critical group level processes involved in building a good transactive 
memory system. A transactive memory system is critical for teams. Individuals on the 
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team must leverage the expertise of others on the team to conduct their tasks (Lewis, 
2003). 
Interactive Team Cognition 
Cooke et al (2013) proposed a theory of Interactive Team Cognition which is a 
more recent perspective on team cognition which states that team cognition is displayed 
in team interactions and that it is an activity, not a property or a product, and it needs to 
be measured at the team level and in the context of the task. This is in contrast to the 
theory of shared cognition which states that team cognition is the sum of the knowledge 
of individual team members. However it does not discount the importance of individual 
knowledge for effective performance, but argues instead that team cognition is not tied to 
the knowledge of the individual members of the team and that traditional methods to 
measure team cognition using introspection and subjective queries will not essentially 
capture the depth of team cognition. The authors also argue that team cognition has to be 
studied at the team level and not at the individual level and in addition, it has to be 
studied in the context in which the task is performed which could be a simulated context 
of the real world task like cyber defense. Training large teams for shared cognition 
through cross training is not practical and is also not sustainable for large teams and 
teams performing complex tasks for which each member has a specific set of skills and 
expertise. Perturbation training (Gorman, Cooke, & Amazeen, 2010) is the training 
approach associated with interactive team cognition. It involves presenting disruptions or 
roadblocks while the team performs its task which will consequently require them as a 
team to modify and coordinate their tasks in new ways.   
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Interactive team cognition adopts an ecological perspective (human-environment) 
or between-the-heads (BTH) approach (Cooke, Gorman, & Kiekel, 2008) and suggests 
that observing team communication is an unobtrusive and an easier method to measuring 
and understanding team cognition in the context of the task. 
By taking the interactive team cognition perspective, it can be deduced that in 
order to improve cyber defense performance, developing tools and interventions focusing 
on just improving the individual’s knowledge and decision making abilities will not be 
sufficient. Developing tools and training interventions that improve team level processes 
such as communication and information sharing in cyber defense analysts is equally 
important for improving system level performance.  
Communication is the key medium through which a team of humans form 
relationships, collaborate and share information. Communication could be conducted 
through various forms such as face-to-face communication, non-verbal communication 
and even through virtual mediums such as telephone networks and internet networks. 
Whatever the form be, communication is a key element in the team process. 
Team Communication 
Early research on teams reported that team communication can be inhibitory to 
team performance and that it has to be restricted (Briggs & Naylor, 1965; Johnston & 
Briggs, 1968; Williges, Johnston, & Briggs, 1966), which led researchers to focus 
predominantly on improving individual efficiency. Later research (Brannick, Roach, & 
Salas, 1993; Salas et al., 1992; Stout, Salas, & Carson, 1994) however reported that team 
processes such as communication and interaction are also essential for performance. 
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Communication can be verbal communication or non-verbal communication (such as 
gestures), synchronous communication or asynchronous communication.  
To investigate team cognition, from the interactive team cognition perspective, it 
is imperative to record all verbal communications taking place between the members of 
the team during the experiment session. The mode of communication could be through 
face-to-face when it will be recorded through a microphone or it could be through a 
computer chat system when the communication will be saved as text files. This 
communication data will then have to be transcribed and analyzed to identify patterns and 
gaps and consequently to gain important insights about team cognition. 
Communication analysis traditionally involves transcribing and coding 
communication data manually. Such a manual process is strenuous, time consuming, 
rated subjectively and often analyzed outside the context (Cooke, et al., 2008). 
Automated methods to analyze communication data are becoming popular. Latent 
Semantic Analysis (Landauer, Foltz, & Laham, 1998) and keyword indexing are two 
automated methods for analyzing the content of the communication data. ProNet (Cooke, 
Neville, & Rowe, 1996), which is based on Pathfinder network scaling (Schvaneveldt, 
Durso, & Dearholt, 1989), is a method for analyzing flow patterns in communication 
data. 
Team communication and collaboration have been identified as important for 
explaining performance differences between teams performing cyber defense analysis 
(Jariwala, Champion, Rajivan, & Cooke, 2012). Simply increasing communication 
among cyber defense analysts may not improve performance unless the communication is 
useful communication that can contribute to advancing team cognition such as team 
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situation awareness. Situation awareness in particular has gained wide interest in the 
cyber security domain because cyber security is a hyper-dimensional environment and it 
is important for analysts to be aware of key events happening in the network and 
prioritize them by filtering out irrelevant information in order to take appropriate 
response. 
Situation Awareness  
There are several definitions of situation awareness (SA), however the definition 
which is widely used is “the perception of the elements in the environment within a 
volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of 
their status in the near future” (Endsley, 1995, p. 97). Endsley’s definition and model of 
SA has been widely adopted by researchers in the cyber domain because it is similar to 
the JDL (Joint Directors of Laboratories) data fusion model which is widely used in the 
cyber domain. JDL data fusion model is a five level model that describes how data from 
multiple sources can be integrated to get a unified view (Hall & Llinas, 1997; Blasch, 
Bosse, and Lambert, 2012). Level 0 in the JDL model is called Sub-Object Assessment 
and involves detecting signals in the incoming data. This is similar to perception phase of 
Endsley’s model. Level 1 (called Object Assessment) and level 2 (called Situation 
Assessment) involves association and aggregation of the information from level 0 to form 
hypotheses and to understand the situation at hand. This is similar to the comprehension 
phase of Endsley’s model. Finally Level 3 (called Impact Assessment) involves drawing 
inferences and impact estimation which is similar to the projection phase of Endsley’s 
model. Level 4 and 5 are the more recent additions to the JDL model to take into account 
the process and user cognition aspects of data fusion.  
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Information quantity, which is excessive in the cyber domain, has been identified 
as one of the key factors impacting SA (Endsley, 2000; Taylor, 1990). Endsley (1995) 
suggests that situation awareness is a product of the situation assessment process, 
performed by analysts while working with large quantities of information. Technologies 
such as data filters (example: Wireshark and Snort), fusion algorithms (Stotz & Sudit, 
2007) and visualizations (Shiravi, Shiravi, & Ghorbani, 2011) are being developed to 
assist in cyber analysis and to provide analysts a better picture of the complex cyber 
world. However, it is important to recognize that the “awareness” in situation awareness 
resides neither with the analyst alone, nor with the technology alone, but with the joint 
human-technology system (McNeese, Cooke, & Champion, 2011).  
Situation awareness is a dynamic cognitive process whereby an individual 
continuously modifies and updates his or her SA with new information from the 
environment. This dynamic property makes SA difficult to assess and measure (Prince, 
Ellis, Brannick, & Salas, 2007). Factors found to affect SA in analysts are: Attentional 
tunneling, Requisite Memory Trap, Workload, Data Overload, Misplaced Salience, 
Complexity Creep, Errant Mental Model and Out-of-loop syndrome (M. R. Endsley, 
2006). 
Situation awareness conceptualized at the team level is called team situation 
awareness (Team SA). Team SA is viewed as an important factor to be considered in 
designing human-machine systems and interfaces (Shu & Furuta, 2005). Endsley defines 
team SA as “the degree to which every team member possesses the SA required for his or 
her responsibilities” (Endsley, 1989). According to this perspective, the team’s 
performance depends on the level of situation awareness in each of the team members 
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and one member’s poor SA can affect the team’s performance. However, this model of 
team SA does not go far enough (Gorman, Cooke, & Winner, 2006). It may be relevant to 
homogenous groups, but not to heterogeneous teams and this perspective may not suffice 
as team increases in size (Cooke, Gorman, & Rowe, 2004).  If a team is truly an 
interdependent group, then each team member will have different, though perhaps 
overlapping, perspectives on the situation.  In a complex and dynamic world, it is likely 
that two or more perspectives on the team will need to be fused in order to have SA that 
extends beyond an analyst’s screen of alerts. The fusion takes place through some form 
of team interaction – often communication. For example, one analyst may be aware of a 
denial of service attack on a network server and once this information is joined with 
another analyst’s awareness of two other similar attacks on a different network a bigger 
picture emerges. Without the interaction, the team as a whole cannot perceive, 
comprehend, and project. 
In short, team SA is much more than the sum of individual SA (Salas, Prince, 
Baker, & Shrestha, 1995). This follows from the perspective of Interactive Team 
Cognition (Cooke, Gorman, Myers, & Duran, in press) that espouses that cognitive 
processing at the team level occurs through team interactions situated in a rich context. 
This view of team cognition can be contrasted with others that focus on the aggregate of 
individual knowledge (e.g., Langan-Fox, Code, & Langfield-Smith, 2000).  Thus by 
placing the focus on team interaction, team situation awareness can be described as the 
coordinated perception of change in the environment by team members that serve as the 
basis for effective action (Gorman et al., 2006). According to this view, team SA means, 
members of a team becoming aware of different aspects of the situation and knitting the 
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pieces of the puzzle together through communication or other interactions to achieve 
team situation awareness and to take appropriate actions. (Salas et al., 1995).  This view 
(Cooke, Salas, Kiekel, & Bell, 2004) suggest that team members through team 
interactions transform individual knowledge to collective knowledge and in the process 
achieve team situation awareness. 
Team cognition and its processes have been profusely investigated in other 
domains such as medical diagnosis, air traffic control and intelligence analysis. Hence 
there is a large collection of literature on cognitive biases that affect team cognition in 
those domains. However, as suggested earlier, researchers in the cyber security domain 
have predominantly focused on the technical side of the problem, even though it has been 
widely characterized as a socio-technical problem (Dutta & McCrohan, 2002; Kraemer, 
Carayon, & Clem, 2009). Studies to explore the human side of the cyber problem are 
minimal and most have focused on the individual analyst because the task on first sight 
seems to be an individual cognitive task. Champion et al., (2012) found that team 
processes such as communication and collaboration play important roles in the outcome 
performance, which is detecting potential cyber attacks. There is very little work done so 
far to explore the various aspects of team cognition of cyber defense. Therefore I will 
review literature from a related field of work: intelligence analysis, to identify the types 
of cognitive limitations and biases the analysts face in such domains especially at the 
team level. Intelligence analysis is a field of work similar to cyber defense analysis, but 
instead of looking at computer logs and intrusion alerts, analysts look at email intercepts, 




Lowenthal (2002) defines intelligence analysis as “the process by which specific 
types of information important to the national security are requested, collected, analyzed 
and provided to policymakers” (p. 8). Therefore, to get a preliminary understanding on 
the probable cognitive limitations and biases in cyber defense, related work in the 
intelligence analysis domain was examined. The intelligence analysis task is also found 
to be cognitively demanding work, with considerable time pressure and is also considered 
risky because the decisions that the analysts take can either help the nation or could 
create unwanted chaos (Johnston, 2005). Similar to analysts in the cyber domain, 
intelligence analysts must deal with intentionally misleading information, missing 
information and incorrect information (Johnston, 2005). And similar to cyber defense,  
the notion that “knowledge is power” prevails and the culture is competitive whereby 
individuals are trying to get the first hand information before others for job bonuses and 
promotions which inhibits information sharing (Vogt et al., 2011).  
Kahneman and Klein (2009) suggest that it may not be possible to achieve 
optimal decisions in complex, information-overloaded domains such as intelligence 
analysis. Loss in group level process such as communication and collaboration can also 
lead to suboptimal decision making in complex environments (Hill, 1982). Improving 
group level process in information overloaded environments could lead to more optimal 
decision making because the group will then be able to effectively use the diverse 
knowledge, experience and skills of the group members (Laughlin & Bonner, 1999; 
Mesmer-Magnus & DeChurch, 2009a). Factors such as the common knowledge effect 
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(CKE), confirmation bias, overconfidence, and group polarization are found to cause 
process loss in intelligence analysis teams (Straus, Parker, & Bruce, 2011). 
The common knowledge effect or CKE (Gigone & Hastie, 1993) occurs when a 
part of a group knows the relevant information, but fails to communicate it to the rest of 
the members assuming it is common knowledge. Confirmation bias occurs when a group 
looks only for information that serves as supporting evidence to a preconceived 
hypothesis they developed about the situation instead of looking for information that 
would dispute the hypothesis (Heuer, 1999; Johnston, 2005). Heuer (1999) suggested 
tools used in intelligence analysis should challenge the analyst to reduce the confirmation 
bias effect.  
Overconfidence is when individuals or groups overestimate their knowledge 
which leads them to make overconfident decisions and is found to exist in complex 
environments with uncertainty such as the intelligence analysis domain (Heuer, 1999; 
Yates, 1990). Teams with many overconfident individuals tend to have less interaction 
within the team because they do not find the need to seek additional information from 
other team members. Such teams are found to exhibit low performance in comparison to 
teams with not so confident members because they have to verify their decisions or 
findings (Puncochar & Fox, 2004; Sieck & Arkes, 2005).  
Group polarization occurs when individuals change their decisions and attitudes 
they have towards the problem to match the rest of the team members’ decisions (Brauer, 
Judd, & Gliner, 1995). Kelly, Jackson, & Hutson-Comeaux (1997) and Schulz-Hardt, 
Jochims, & Frey (2002) suggest that having heterogeneous teams (i.e. teams with 
individuals with diverse experience, skill and knowledge) in such domains could reduce 
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the effect of such biases because having individuals with diverse experience and skills in 
the same team will enable the team to view and think about the situation at hand from 
different perspectives and will enable the team to come up with different strategies.  
Simply knowing about the existence of various biases is insufficient. It is 
necessary to get an understanding about why such biases are present and to find the 
source of the bias in order to effectively mitigate them. The next section reviews the 
literature on human reasoning to find answers to the questions about the origin and source 
of biases. 
Reasoning and Biases 
Reasoning is the underlying ability in humans that enables them to think, make 
sense of things, make arguments, form new beliefs and opinions and reinforce or reject 
existing beliefs and opinions (Kompridis, 2000). It is considered to be the distinguishing 
characteristic of human beings that enables them to innovate and conduct knowledge-
based tasks. However a long literature indicates that humans are poor at reasoning and 
that decisions arising from our reasoning are often flawed due to biases (Kahneman, 
Slovic, & Tversky, 1982).  
The traditional belief was that humans developed the reasoning ability to find 
truth, to reinforce personal beliefs and to improve individual cognition (Kahneman,2003, 
p. 699; Sloman,1996, p. 18). More recently, an evolutionary psychology perspective was 
taken to explain the origin of reasoning by Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber through their 
argumentative theory (Mercier & Sperber, 2011). They state that humans developed 
reasoning to support social functions. Evolutionarily, humans started collaborating to 
21 
hunt, find food and to defend them from threats. To work in groups, humans had to 
develop agreements by resolving difference of opinion which required them to develop 
reasons for their opinions and to communicate this reasoning to others in the group.  
According to the argumentative theory, humans in a group play two roles: 
convincer and convincee. Convincer, based on their intuitive beliefs, develop and 
communicate arguments to others in a group to persuade others to also be convinced 
about what they believe is the correct course of action. To effectively persuade, only 
confirming arguments that support their individual beliefs are collected and presented. In 
return, others in the social setting (convincee) may be ready to be persuaded because they 
have the same set of beliefs or might defend because they do not share the same set of 
beliefs. But from an evolutionary stand point, because working as a group was essential, 
people would take moderate stand points in which they resist new arguments initially, but 
later on accept arguments that are valid. 
As it can be deduced, such a reasoning process that involves finding reasons to 
defend one’s opinions to others, aimed at supporting social functions, is biased. If the 
beliefs and reasons are valid then they will lead to good decisions; otherwise they will 
lead to flawed decisions. Working alone can more often lead to biased decisions because 
there is now way to evaluate one’s beliefs, opinions or hypotheses. So to mitigate such 
biases humans have to work in group with a heterogeneous set of people and at the group 
level, members should be able to produce competing arguments, evaluate arguments, 
accept good arguments and reject the bad ones.  
Complementing the argumentative theory with interactive team cognition theory, 
it can be deduced that such biases have to be studied at the group/team level to identify 
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patterns of arguments communicated back and forth between the members of a team and 
find interventions to help individuals to produce new competing arguments and also to 
evaluate all hypotheses presented by others by using all the information available with 
them. 
To identify cognitive biases that would be present in cyber defense analyst teams 
conducting the detection task, a closer look at the task of such analysts is necessary. As 
described earlier, the primary task of cyber defense analyst conducting the detection task 
as part of forensics analysis is to analyze attack evidence from a long time period to 
detect whether the evidence correlates and whether an emerging threat is indicated. 
Forensics analysis are sometimes performed in collaboration but mostly it is done in 
isolation. Therefore the existing process is ineffective and it would be beneficial if 
analysts pooled observations or evidence from their peer analysts’ reports to find 
associations. Presumably, if the analysts were able to effectively pool and fuse their 
individual observations, attack detection performance would improve. 
However the literature reviewed shows us that biases such as the common 
knowledge effect and confirmation bias can lead to a biased discussion and that having 
analysts to discuss and fuse information might not lead to better performance after all. 
Thus, careful investigation is necessary to identify whether such biases affect cyber 
defense analysts. Then techniques and tools to mitigate these biases have to be 
developed. 
 The common knowledge effect, information pooling bias, and confirmation bias 
are parts of a larger paradigm popular in social psychology called the hidden profile 
paradigm (Straus et al., 2011). 
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Hidden Profile Paradigm 
Teams are employed to make complex decisions because they can expand the 
pool of available information and when the team members pool all of their diverse 
experience and information we intuitively assume they would achieve optimal decisions 
that would almost be impossible for an individual expert to achieve (Mesmer-Magnus & 
DeChurch, 2009b). Similarly when cyber defense analysts collaborate they would have to 
pool all the information available to them to make sense of the entire threat landscape 
pertinent to the network they are defending. The information pooling process involves 
sharing and receiving of information between members to update one’s own mental 
model about the situation at hand, to make new connections, and for general sense 
making. If they do not share all of the information, especially their expert knowledge, 
with each other they cannot make the connections that might exist between their 
individual observations, identify the possible trends in their observations, and discover 
overlapping incidents happening at different parts of the network.  
Intuitively one might think that when a group of people discuss they would share 
the novel or unique information available to them instead of the information already 
known to all because the novel information and arguments are more influential than that 
which is known to all (Burnstein & Vinokur, 1977). However, past research shows that 
groups are not so effective in pooling all of the available information (Lu, Yuan, & 
McLeod, 2012; Wittenbaum, Hollingshead, & Botero, 2004). The information pooling 
process in a group is known to be rife with cognitive biases (Puvathingal & Hantula, 
2011; Stasser & Titus, 1985; Straus et al., 2011). One such cognitive bias is the shared 
information bias or information pooling bias in which the pre-distributed information and 
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analyst knowledge biases them to share information that is already known to others and 
prevents them from sharing new information (Stasser & Titus, 1985). The possible causes 
for this bias include preferences made by the members before the discussion causing 
them to confirm to initial beliefs, the memory recency effect, the frequency of 
mentioning the shared information, and the need for individuals to seek social validation 
for their initial beliefs (Lu et al., 2012; Stasser & Titus, 1985). In the past this paradigm 
has been mostly investigated from a social psychology point of view, but there could be 
underlying cognitive factors that are causing such a bias and that the social causes found 
could be mere manifestations of the individual cognitive limitations. 
Strasser and Titus (1985) introduced the hidden profile paradigm. The research 
showed that group discussion might not be an effective means for exchanging new or 
novel information. In such information sampling studies the decision making groups are 
asked to make decisions by pooling each individual’s information and discussing the 
different alternatives. In such studies the information is distributed across the team 
members such that some information is shared by all the team members, but there is some 
unique information given to each team member. The information that is shared is called 
“Shared” and the other is called “Unshared” (Wittenbaum et al., 2004). The goal set for 
the team is to pool all the unique information to achieve the optimal decision. However 
time after time the studies show that the groups do not pool the unique information 
available to individual members; rather they keep discussing the shared information (Lu 
et al., 2012). There is a difference between the groups studied under this paradigm and 
cyber defense analysts conducting the detection task. The original experiments focused 
on getting one optimum solution such as finding the murderer by a mock jury team or 
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finding a leader by a mock political caucus team.  In these cases there is a clear presence 
of choices and only one choice is optimal. Also the shared information between the 
members of the team about the items to make decisions about would be exactly the same. 
But in cyber defense there is no one optimal choice given that there is a need to respond 
to all attacks. However, there will be different priorities between different attacks for 
which a higher priority could be given to attacks that are large in scale and which are 
stealthy because they usually lead to maximum damage. Also the individual analysts 
have similar information about similar kinds of attacks which would be the shared 
information, but the shared information is not exactly the same across all team members. 
Groups with unequal information distribution were found to be eight times less 
likely to find the solution than were groups having full information (Lu et al., 2012). It 
was also found that percentage of unique information mentioned out of the  total 
available information (the information coverage measure) and the percentage of unique 
information out of the total discussion (the discussion focus measure), were positively 
related to decision quality, but the effect of information coverage was stronger than that 
of discussion focus (Lu, et al., 2012). Stasser and Titus (1987) noted that when each 
member of a group discloses the same amount of shared and unshared information, in 
other words having no bias towards certain information, there is still a sampling 
advantage towards the shared information at the group level because more people know 
the shared information.  
Groups tend to communicate and discuss information that is known to majority of 
the members of the team, but fail to communicate information that is uniquely available 
to each person. Therefore, simply getting a team of analysts to collaborate and discuss is 
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unlikely to provide a boost in the performance. Critical investigation is necessary to 
identify the cognitive issues involved when cyber teams collaborate, to determine 
whether they communicate and collaborate effectively, and to discover interventions to 
help them communicate and collaborate more effectively.  
To study such cognitive biases, an environment with sufficient experimental 
control and which is representative of the real world cyber defense task is required. Field 
studies offer very little experimental control, but the findings from observations and 
interviews would be ecologically valid. Conducting field studies in the cyber defense 
context is difficult because the cyber defense task is highly technical and confidential in 
nature which inhibits participants from participating in the research. Also collecting 
cognitive measures is often difficult with field based studies. 
Experiments on the other hand are a better option to study the human element of 
cyber defense. By nature they provide good experimental control and the task is relatively 
easy to simulate in the lab with good fidelity because it is mainly a computer based task 
with low human mobility as opposed to other tasks such as military warfare which 
involves external and environmental effects that would affect the human while the task is 
carried out.  
Although human-in-the-loop experiments offer good experimental control, they 
offer less flexibility to understand the various cognitive processes involved in doing a 
certain task. Computational cognitive modeling methodology can supplement this 
limitation and can enable the experimenter to study the intricacies of cognitive processes 
which are difficult to infer from experiments (Newell 1990 and Sun 2009). But such 
cognitive models, however accurate, are not recommended to be used in isolation to 
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develop cognitive theories of a certain task. They should always be coupled with 
experiments and used to extend existing experiments, generate new hypotheses, develop 
future theories, and to explore a combination of parameters which are difficult to explore 
with a lab based experiment. (Sun 2008) 
Cognitive Modeling 
Cognitive models represent one or many human cognitive processes such as 
perception, decision making, and language comprehension. Cognitive models are mostly 
built for the purpose of understanding and predicting human cognition. Cognitive models 
come in a variety of forms from simple box and line based diagrammatic models to 
models that use mathematical equations and even to dynamic computational models that 
use software programs. 
Computational cognitive modeling helps to describe specific cognitive processes, 
associated with a task or in general, using computer algorithms (Turing, 1950). Some 
have taken a strictly artificial intelligence perspective (Schank & Abelson, 1977; 
Minsky,1975) in which there is less emphasis on comparing the model output with 
human data. 
Computational cognitive modeling using cognitive architectures has been 
receiving more traction recently because it provides more capabilities, allows testing and 
validation and even provides visual capabilities to observe the phenomenon modelled as 
it unfolds over time. Cognitive architectures such as ACT-R (Anderson, 1996) and SOAR 
(Laird, Newell, & Rosenbloom, 1987) are popular examples of computational cognitive 
modeling.  
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These architectures provide a framework and libraries to build models which 
make modeling simpler compared to building a model from the bottom up. ACT-R and 
SOAR are types of computational cognitive modeling methodologies that use 
mathematical formulations of cognitive process combined with the power of 
programming language and computational power of computers to run complex computer 
simulations of various cognitive processes. ACT-R and SOAR have grown over the years 
into a large collection of libraries of cognitive processes.  
In addition to using such cognitive architectures and models for strictly 
comprehension and theory development purposes, they have also been used to develop 
intelligent applications such as intelligent assistants (Guerra, 2011), learning assistants 
(Koedinger, Anderson, Hadley, Mark 1997) and synthetic teammates (Ball et al., 2010).  
Such cognitive architectures have predominantly focused on the individual’s 
cognition and have not been extended to agent-based, groups and particularly teams. A 
need to combine agent-based simulations with intelligent agents has been expressed in 
the past (Sun, 2006b) and there has been some work in the past on developing agent-
based cognitive architectures (Sun, 2006a). However, work in that direction has been 
slow and there is a dearth of research on integrating the individual intelligent agents with 
agent-based simulations. 
Although new agent-based simulation environments are being developed by 
extending existing cognitive architectures, another approach would be to leverage 
existing proven agent-based simulations used in social science and build cognitive agents 
within them. The cognitive processes modelled in these agents need not be as 
comprehensive as in these architectures, but could be limited to processes that are 
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relevant to the intended research. This could be done instead of putting the effort in 
building a complete intelligent agent and extending it to agent-based. For example, for 
studying team cognition more effort could be put into modelling the interactions between 
the agents and less effort in developing a perfect intelligent agent. Though the approach 
of building a unified architecture is the ultimate goal, researchers could use this approach 
in the mean time to explore questions pertinent to team cognition and group cognition.  
Agent-Based Modeling 
Agent-based modelling is a computational modeling technique used for research 
in the social sciences research domain. It is often used by social scientists to study several 
social constructs such as hunter-gatherer problems (Barceló et al., 2013; Janssen & Hill, 
2013), prisoner’s dilemma (Wilensky, 2002) and so forth. It has also been used often to 
study epidemic diffusion in the population (Carley et al., 2006). The prime focus in 
developing agent-based models is in studying the interactions between the agents and to 
study the patterns and emergent properties produced by those interactions.  
In agent-based models, the agents act autonomously to achieve set goals which 
require them to interact with other autonomous agents locally and also to develop 
adaptive behavior based on the current environmental state (Grimm & Railsback, 2005). 
Agents are assigned rules and algorithms to carry out the individual process and for 
interacting with other agents. Because the focus has been on the social interactions, the 
assumptions made about individual cognition have been very rudimentary (Sun, 2006a). 
Agent-based modeling can be extended by leveraging findings from cognitive sciences to 
model more intelligent agents. Hence the outputs from the cognitive modeling efforts can 
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be used as inputs for developing agent-based models for which the individual agents in 
the agent-based simulation could be developed based on the cognitive models of cyber 
defense operators. 
Interestingly, agent-based models are described as a methodology to study macro-
level patterns emerging from micro-level social interactions between agents. This 
definition has a stark similarity to the definition of interactive team cognition (Cooke, 
Gorman, Myers, & Duran, 2013) which is also characterized as a macro-level 
phenomenon emerging from micro-level interactions between the members of the team. 
Hence, agent-based modeling seems well-suited to modeling team cognition in cyber 
defense operators. Similar to cognitive modeling the output of agent-based models should 
be compared to that of an associated human-in-the-loop cyber defense experiment.  
Agent-based models can extend experiments to explore new phenomenon that are 
difficult to investigate with human participants such as experimenting with very large 
teams and longitudinal experiments that extend over a long period. Agent-based models 
must be developed in close alignment with the human-in-the-loop experiment it is 
extending where the rules of individual process and rules of interactions must be 
developed based on the tasks performed by human participants in the lab. 
Agent-based models can be useful in generating new hypotheses, developing 
future theories, and exploring a combination of parameters which are difficult to explore 
with a lab based experiment (Sun 2008). Also developing such computational models 
will allow easy sharing and reuse and extension by a larger community. 
One of the objectives of this dissertation is to develop a prototype collaboration tool 
that will improve information sharing. Towards that objective I will be reviewing the 
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different collaboration tools used in the intelligence analysis domain and will also be 
reviewing existing collaboration tools used in cyber security. 
Tools Aiding Collaboration 
There are a range of tools (web based and standalone) in the market that help 
teams to communicate and collaborate, conduct discussions, build knowledge and 
develop hypotheses collaboratively. Tools in the form of chat interfaces, online forums 
and email clients are commonly used for communication and collaboration. Chat-based 
systems enable synchronous communication. Forum and email based systems enable 
asynchronous communication. Such generic tools would provide some collaboration 
assistance, but developing collaboration tools specifically for each domain considering all 
of the unique requirements is necessary in order to improve team performance in each 
domain. This is particularly important for domains that primarily involve knowledge 
work such as medical diagnosis, research and development, intelligence analysis and 
cyber defense. In such domains, the individuals or the groups have to construct new 
knowledge out of massive amounts of information, but humans have mental limitations 
that strain this process and hence require carefully designed tools that would enhance the 
ability of the groups to construct, organize and share knowledge (Stahl 2006).  
Collaboration tools for knowledge sharing are popular in the educational domain. 
Tools such as Teacher’s Curriculum Assistant (TCA), Hermes and webguide are used for 
collaborative knowledge building (Stahl, Koschmann, & Suthers, 2006). As 
transdisciplinary research is gaining more traction, collaboration tools are being 
considered essential for managing transdisciplinary research, to share knowledge across 
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transdisciplinary teams and teams that are geographically distributed (Bietz et al., 2012; 
Schnapp, Rotschy, Crowley & O’Rourke, 2012; Vogel et al., 2013).  
Several collaboration tools are being developed for collaborative intelligence 
analysis which is a domain that is comparable to cyber defense in terms of both cognitive 
load and tasks performed. There have been efforts to develop stand-alone collaboration 
tools that are used strictly for collaboration and then there have been efforts to develop 
collaboration tools that are deeply integrated with the existing analysis task. 
Collaboration features integrated deep into the existing work process allow the analyst to 
use an integrated system and thus does not divert attention from the primary task of 
analysis (Bier, Card, & Bodnar, 2008). 
POLESTAR (Pioch, & Everett, 2006) is a knowledge management tool for 
intelligence analysis with extended collaboration features. The tool suggests what other 
analysts have reported who were working on similar analyses by leveraging their notes 
and reports. This way of suggesting would lead to ad hoc group creation. It also allows 
analysts to share their reports with each other and assists in getting peer reviews from 
their team members. Cemberia (Isenberg & Fisher 2009) is a tabletop (Microsoft surface) 
visual analytic software that allows small groups of analysts to collaboratively forage for 
the information available and construct a story and hypothesis about the situation at hand. 
The software uses the visualization technique of brushing and linking (Buja, Mcdonald, 
Michalak & Stuetzlew, 1991) in which the changes made by one analyst are propagated 
on the other analyst’s visualization, thereby improving awareness.  
Commentspace (Willett, Heer, Hellerstein, & Agrawala, 2011) is a collaborative 
visual analytic tool that uses tags and links between individual comments on a forum 
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based visualization system to help analysts in information gathering and sensemaking. 
Individual analysts can post comments to a topic, tag comments as hypotheses, or a 
question and in return, other analysts can find existing evidence and link each to 
hypotheses or questions posted on the forum, consequently helping all analysts to make 
sense of the situation at hand. Then there are collaboration tools that help analysts 
organize information around entities such as people, places and things instead of having 
them collaborate on free textual information (Bier, Card, & Bodnar, 2008). 
The other approach used to facilitate collaboration in the intelligence analysis 
domain is through large high resolution displays which can be used as collaboration tools 
for enabling co-located individuals to share information and to make sense of the 
information collaboratively (Vogt, et al, 2011). The software used by individual analysts 
is configured to receive information from multiple input devices and analysts, thereby 
facilitating information sharing with the team.  
However, in the cyber domain, there has not been much focus on developing 
collaboration tools to improve collaboration and information sharing between cyber 
defense analysts. A few research projects that have come close to looking at the 
collaboration and information sharing aspects of cyber security include VULCAN (Hui et 
al., 2010) and TAXII (Connolly, Davidson, Richard, & Skorupka, 2012). The VULCAN 
project focusses on improving information and situation awareness between cyber 
analysts across organizational boundaries. They proposed to achieve this by tracking each 
analyst’s work process and extracting data on the internet sources they search and 
questions they ask on the data they are analyzing. They use this information to assist 
other analysts working in other organizations during their analysis. TAXII or Trusted 
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Automated eXchange of Indicator Information is a community driven development effort 
which allows one organization to safely and in an automated manner share the threats 
they are observing in their organizations which might help other organizations to prevent 
such a threat from affecting them. Overall, there is a lack of effective tools and solutions 
to assist cyber defense personnel to collaborate and share information within an 
organization.  
Summary of Background 
Cyber defense analysis is a complex task in which analysts are overloaded with 
missing, incorrect, and intentionally altered information leading to cognitive overload, 
low situation awareness and stress that affects their performance and in turn affects 
organization’s security posture. Though cyber defense analysts are set up to work as a 
team, there are a variety of factors that thwart teamwork. From expert interviews, surveys 
and from past literature, it was found that factors such as institutional rewards structures, 
lack of team training, lack of collaboration tools and in addition the human biases such as 
the common knowledge effect, the confirmation bias, overconfidence, the information 









This dissertation work was inspired not only by the relevant literature, but also by 
research conducted by the author and others. Surveys and interviews conducted with 
cyber defense analysts and subject matter experts from both the military and private 
organizations indicate that cyber defense analysts in general lack teamwork and that the 
rewarding structures employed to motivate them are also conducive to individual effort 
instead of team effort (Champion et al., 2012). Cyber defense analysts are offered 
individual level bonuses for good performance. This kind of rewarding structure could be 
leading to a notion of knowledge is power in cyber defense analysts which in turn would 
inhibit information flow and communication among them. Loss of information flow and 
communication would affect availability of essential knowledge for attack detection 
which will in turn deteriorate the overall security performance. 
Recognizing team level efforts, in addition to providing individual level rewards, 
would encourage analysts to proactively collaborate and share information. Analysts in a 
team could leverage each other’s expertise and knowledge during attack detection and 
share the rewards for their performance. This would lead to higher performance than 
conducting attack detection individually and keeping all the rewards for oneself.  
A three person team, human-in-the-loop experiment (Rajivan et al., 2013), was 
conducted to investigate the effect of team level rewards in contrast to individual level 
rewards on attack detection performance in cyber defense analysts. Participants used the 
simulation environment CyberCog to conduct the cyber defense task. Participants were 
primed and rewarded to work either individually or as a team while triaging and detecting 
cyber attacks from the intrusion alerts. In the experiment, the participants were 
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overloaded with data and a time crunch to recreate the cognitive overload experienced by 
real world cyber defense analysts. Also participants in both experimental conditions 
could either choose to transfer unfamiliar alerts to other members of the team for analysis 
or learn to analyze those alerts themselves using the lookup system which provided a 
textual description of the analysis procedure. 
The primary measure of team performance was based on the Signal Detection 
Theory (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). For the alerts analyzed the number of hits (number 
of suspicious alerts the team classified as suspicious), misses (number of suspicious alerts 
the team classified as benign), false positives (number of benign alerts the team classified 
as suspicious), and correct rejections (number of benign alerts the team classified as 
benign) were recorded. Subjective impressions of workload were measured using the 
NASA TLX (Hart & Staveland, 1988) at the end of each Mission.  
It was found that team performance was significantly better than group 
performance on novel and difficult to analyze alerts. It is imperative that cyber defense 
analysts analyze such novel, non-intuitive “hard” type of alerts accurately because they 
are more often the real attacks which lead to destructive and expensive consequences. 
From the results it can be inferred that the cyber defense analysts can achieve higher 
performance by simply collaborating with other analysts to leverage each other’s unique 
expertise and knowledge to analyze alerts that are novel and non-intuitive to them. 
Putting the extra effort to collaborate on everything might be detrimental to their 
performance. 
In the experiment described previously, the participant teams were organized to 
be heterogeneous in terms of the knowledge they possessed from training to conduct the 
37 
tasks. However, cyber defense groups in the real world are usually composed of people 
with similar experience and knowledge with similar responsibilities. Therefore it is 
important to contrast this performance to that of a homogenous group of cyber defense 
analysts as in the real world. It is also important to investigate the effect of team size on 
cyber defense performance. 
An agent-based model (Rajivan, Janssen & Cooke, 2013) that simulates the task 
of computer network intrusion detection and the interactions among analysts while 
conducting intrusion detection was developed. The model was an extension to the 
human-in-the-loop experiment described. The agent-based model extended that 
experiment to investigate the research questions: Does team heterogeneity affect attack 
detection performance in cyber defense analysts? Do large teams or small teams lead to 
better attack detection performance in cyber defense analysts?  
Agents in the model were characterized by their technological capabilities they 
possess for cyber defense. Based on working memory literature (Miller, 1956) each agent 
was assigned a memory capacity because there is a boundary on the possible number of 
capabilities an agent can possess, given that the agents represent humans. All agents were 
also assigned an equal set of points which they can expand by receiving rewards for 
solving alerts. 
Each agent can analyze the alert assigned and get rewards if the agent already had 
the required capability with them or if not the agent has two options: (1) Learn how to 
process the alert with a certain probability of accuracy and acquire the capability or (2) 
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Collaborate, if allowed, with the partners they found and acquire the capability from the 
partners instead of learning. Both of the options had a cost and payoff.  
The three experimental conditions used in the model were: No collaboration, 
conservative collaboration, and progressive collaboration defined in terms of the way the 
agents find their partners. In the conservative condition, the agents searched for other 
similar agents in terms of capabilities (homogenous teams) and in the progressive 
condition, the agents searched for distinctly different agents (heterogeneous teams). The 
maximum number of partners an agent searches for depends on the maximum partnership 
team size (three, five or six).  
Results indicated that collaboration had a significant effect on performance. 
Collaboration in comparison to no collaboration leads to better performance in terms of 
alerts solved. Furthermore, when agents collaborated with agents who were less similar to 
themselves they solved more alerts when compared to agents who collaborated with other 
agents who were very similar to themselves. This demonstrated that team performance 
would be better in a heterogeneous team. The size of the team was also found to have a 
significant effect on the performance in terms of rewards. Smaller teams fared better 
when compared to larger teams. The final take away from the model is that small teams 
of heterogeneous analysts would improve the overall cyber defense performance in terms 





OVERALL TECHNICAL APPROACH 
I adopted a multifaceted and multi-disciplinary methodological approach to 
investigate my research questions. I used human-in-the-loop experiments to observe and 
measure the effect of information pooling bias in cyber defense analyst teams. I 
developed a prototype visualization collaboration software interface from a cognitive 
engineering perspective to test whether such a visualization tool would help in mitigating 
the bias in cyber defense analyst teams. The tool was then tested in the same human-in-
the-loop simulation environment that was used to measure the bias in the first place. Then 
I extended this empirical work computationally using agent-based simulations to explore 
the underlying cognitive process theories that might be contributing to the bias. The 
methods described draw from disciplines such as cognitive science, social science and 
computer science. 
The overall technical approach and the outputs of this research are described in 
Figure 1. The cyber defense analysis process is unique in ways such as the highly 
technical nature of the domain, the type of data that need to be analyzed, the type of 
threats, the large variance in speed with which the attacks occur and the hyper 
dimensionality of the space in which attacks occur. But it is also similar in the analysis 
process, cognitive load and other cognitive characteristics to domains like intelligence 
analysis and physical threat sensing and detection.  
Based on the parallels identified, I developed hypotheses about cyber defense 
teams to test using task centric simulations and human-in-the-loop experiments. The 
participants in my experiment used a simplified version of the synthetic task environment 
(Cooke, Rivera, Shope, & Caukwell, 1999) called CyberCog (Rajivan, 2012) to perform 
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the detection as part of forensics analysis task of a real world cyber defense analyst. 
Synthetic task environments are simulation environments built to recreate the real world 
tasks and cognitive aspects of the task with highest fidelity possible, giving less focus on 




Figure 1. Pictorial representation of overall technical approach 
CyberCog: Simulation Environment 
CyberCog is a three-person synthetic task environment that simulates the cyber 
defense analysis process. The CyberCog system presents a simulated set of network and 
system security alerts to experimental participants who have to categorize these alerts as 
either benign or suspicious based on the analysis they conduct using other simulated 
information sources such as network and system activity logs, a user database, a security 
news website, and a vulnerability database. Participants must use one or more of these 
additional data sources to accurately analyze each alert presented in the cybercog system. 
For example the participant must use the network/system logs to get more information on 
   

















the activity that raised the alert, must use the user data base to identify if the user reported 
to have been responsible for the activity is authorized and needs to use the vulnerability 
database to know if the activity that caused the alarm was due to a vulnerability exploit.  
Figure 2 is a screen capture of the CyberCog system in which the alerts are 
presented to the participants. Simulated intrusion alerts used in the system are of 15 
different types based on real world intrusion alert types such as alert for malware attack, 
suspicious email messages, buffer overflows and so forth. However, the alerts used in this 
system were simplified versions of their real world counterparts to make them 
understandable to the experimental participants who were not familiar with the domain or 
the task. Simplified does not imply that the alerts are easy to analyze, but simply means 
that they are presented in a form that is free from technical jargon. For this dissertation 
work, the scenarios and scenario data such as the attack descriptions were based on the 
scenario data suite in CyberCog. 
 
Figure 2. Screen capture of the web page presenting intrusion alerts in CyberCog. 
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Conducting human-in-the-loop studies on team cognition in the cyber defense 
context is a challenge because of the highly technical nature of the task. Finding 
participants with cyber defense skills and knowledge is a challenge when the task is 
recreated with all of its fidelities in the lab because access to cyber defense analysts is 
restricted. Recreating a simplified version of the cyber defense task such that participants 
with little to no cyber security knowledge can perform the task is a challenging process. 
Hence using agent-based models as a complimentary approach to human-in-the-loop 
experiments would make the experimental process more efficient because it will help 
extend the lab-based experiments to large sized teams and systems, to study the effect 
observed on teams on a longer duration and also allows the investigation of more 
hypotheses in a quicker and inexpensive manner. 
Agent-based models representing analyst collaboration will be developed. The 
models will enable the study of macro level emergence from micro level interaction 
between the agents. The rules of interactions and behavioral characteristics will be 
modeled based on the findings from literature review, surveys, interviews and field 
observations. Agent-based models can be executed with different research questions 
based on hypotheses and gaps identified from conducting human-in-the-loop experiments 
and will be used to investigate research questions that are beyond the capabilities of 
laboratory experimentation.  
Models by themselves are not very insightful and therefore the data from the 
model has to be finally compared with data from the experiment to make inferences. All 
the methods described in this section were employed in this dissertation work which will 
be described in the following sections. 
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HUMAN-IN-THE-LOOP EXPERIMENT 
I assume that motivating and rewarding analysts to work as a team alone does not 
ensure effective team work and information flow. Pooling from each individual of a team 
the unique knowledge they possess and their expertise in making decisions is the key 
necessity for teamwork. However, past literature shows us that teams by default are 
ineffective in pooling novel information. Teams are known to repeatedly discuss and pool 
information that is commonly known to a majority of the team members. They are known 
to be ineffective in using the unique knowledge available to each team member to make 
decisions. This sort of an effect is popularly known as information pooling bias or hidden 
profile paradigm (Stasser & Titus, 1985). This effect has been observed in a wide array of 
teams such as medical teams (Christensen & Abbott, 2003), military teams (Natter et al., 
2009), intelligence analysis team (Straus et al., 2011) and jury teams (Hastie, Penrod, & 
Pennington, 2013).  
Premise 1  
Cyber defense analysts would likely benefit from pooling novel information and 
knowledge available with their team members in detecting attacks. Other analyst 
members would have information that would confirm or reject one’s initial inferences 
and hypotheses. Other analysts would have knowledge and expertise relevant to 
analyzing a certain kind of attack one is monitoring or they could have information that 
helps to make association between disparate observations. Other analysts might even 
have information that reveals an incident previously deemed to be an isolated event as an 
important event which needs immediate attention and response. However if they do not 
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share such novel information, the effort of the analysts to work as a team may not pay off 
in terms of improved performance. 
Research Question 1 
Does information pooling bias affect cyber defense analyst team discussions and 
decisions? 
Hypothesis 1 
I hypothesize that, cyber defense analysts, conducting the detection task during forensics, 
pool information in a biased manner during team discussions causing them to make sub-
optimal decisions. 
Rationale. Each analyst in the team conducting the detection task during 
forensics would be working on non-overlapping parts of the system. There would be 
conspicuous incidents such as denial of service and regular malware attacks occurring 
across the different parts of the networks and the analysts would want to talk more about 
these incidents during the discussion than the incidents that seem isolated because they 
have made some initial inferences about the conspicuous incidents and are looking for 
validation from other members. They would not discuss the unique events because they 
would have been unable to fit those unique events with their other observations and also 
would be unable to fit them into their mental model of the current network situation. 
Therefore cyber defense analyst teams would be affected by the information pooling bias. 
Premise 2  
Currently, cyber defense analysts are either using off-the-shelf collaboration tools 
in their work or no collaboration tools at all. Off-the-shelf collaboration tools such as 
wiki applications and chat interfaces may facilitate collaboration, but the development of 
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collaboration tools specifically designed to address the unique human knowledge and 
system requirements of cyber defense is necessary to improve analyst performance. The 
individual analyst or the team of analysts have to construct new knowledge about the 
emerging attacks out of massive amounts of information, but humans have mental 
limitations that strain this process and hence require carefully designed tools that would 
enhance the ability of the groups to construct, organize and share knowledge (Stahl, 
2006).  
Research Question 2: 
Does a tailor made collaboration tool lead to superior analyst performance compared to 
using off-the-shelf collaboration tool such as wiki software? 
Hypothesis 2: 
I hypothesize that, tailored collaboration tools developed by considering the cyber 
defense analysts’ cognitive requirements will lead to higher detection performance in 
analysts. 
Rationale: When collaboration tools are developed by taking into consideration 
human strengths and limitations, then intuitively the human performance will be elevated. 
However, the extent of performance improvement depends on the level of thought and 
detail put into understanding the nuances of human behavior and cognition in a particular 
context such as the cyber defense. In this case, the higher level limitation is that cyber 
defense analysts do not collaborate which can be simply be solved by deploying generic 
collaboration tools such as the wiki or chat interfaces. However, the degree to which 
those tools help cyber defense analysts to effectively collaborate is often overlooked or is 
considered an afterthought. Rather than deploying generic tools and investing futile 
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efforts to customize those for collaboration in cyber defense, tools can be developed from 
the ground up. New collaboration tools for cyber defense can be developed through 
detailed thought beforehand about the cyber defense operator’s cognitive requirements 
and limitations in addition to the system requirements to effectively improve team 
performance. 
Wiki as a collaboration tool for forensics 
Wikis are a type of online collaboration tool that enables sharing of data and 
allows collaboratively editing. They are already being used as a collaboration tool by 
cyber defense teams in some organizations. The analysts use wikis to write their 
individual reports and to archive them. Wikis are also used to share the individual reports 
with the rest of the team members. The members on the team can search and retrieve 
other members’ reports. Similarly, in this study, wiki was used in one of the experimental 
conditions to present reports to the participants. The participants can look up others’ 
reports and share one’s own reports with the others. Wiki represents off-the-shelf tools 
that would be used for collaboration. A standard wiki application called DokuWiki meant 
for small scale companies was employed in the experiment. 
Collaboration Visualization Tool for Forensics 
The custom collaborative visualization tool was aimed at addressing the 
information pooling bias found in similar teams such as the medical teams, intelligence 
analysis teams, and presumably cyber defense teams. In the past, most tools proposed to 
address this specific team issue have not been based on the cognitive underpinnings of 
this bias, but rather have focused on trying to motivate the team members to spell out all 
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of the information. Other types of tools such as group decision making software that 
evaluate the decisions after they are made are available, but they do not address the 
problem upfront when the decisions are made. Also the solutions for each type of team 
have to take into consideration the specific needs of the particular domain and context. 
One solution will not fit all team types. Therefore, a tailor-made collaborative 
visualization tool is needed to truly improve collaboration in cyber defense teams. The 
screenshot of the prototype visualization is shown in Figure 3 
 
Figure 3. Screenshot of collaboration tool presenting all the three aspects of the tool.  
The collaborative visualization leverages the individual text reports of attack 
descriptions available to each team member and finds possible connections between them 
based on certain attributes. The association could be based on the type of the attack, 
source IP address, possible attack paths and vulnerabilities. For example one team 
member could be reporting on the same malware as seen by another team member and 
this would create an association between the observations in their reports. Also, for 
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example, one team member could be seeing an intrusion attempt on a system and another 
team member could be seeing a similar intrusion attempt on another system present in 
another part of the network. If the two systems are connected with each other in some 
way and if there is software vulnerability in one system that could cause an intrusion into 
another system then that would create an association between those observations in their 
reports. Finding such associations manually will be very hard because separately these 
would seem to be isolated intrusion attempts. For the sake of this experiment, the 
associations were manually assigned based on the scenario developed. 
The individual observations and possible associations were represented using a 
card based system (Keel, 2004) in which the individual observations were represented in 
card like formats and the connections between the observations were represented using 
lines that connect them. This way of finding connections between individual observations 
available with all team members would overcome the cognitive limitation of humans in 
finding association and fusing information manually. If one does not see these 
connections they might resort to discussing the ones they know are relevant and would 
downplay the observations which do not seem to indicate a high priority threat because 
they were unable to associate it with other such observations available with other team 
members. A screenshot of this tool is presented in Figure 3.  
When a team member is talking about an observation, then that member chooses 
that observation on his or her screen and that will be emphasized along with its 
associations. Now based on the amount of time spent on the observation it will be 
automatically deemphasized by greying out those boxes and other observations and 
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associations will be emphasized automatically to prime and promote the analyst to 
discuss all observations and its associations. This is shown in Figure 3.  
Then the analyst can choose to hide away or mute some of the observations as a 
process of data reduction. They can retrieve it back to the system (un-mute) if they need 
to look over it again. However this form of data reduction can help analysts to again 
discuss all pieces of information equally and will allow analysts to use all pieces of 
information in making their decisions. The grey box in row 1 under analyst 1 in Figure 3 
shows the muted/greyed out representation. 
In summary, the prototype collaboration tool employs three features to tackle the 
information pooling bias in cyber defense analysts. The three features include: visual 
representation of different associations between individual reports represented as cards, 
emphasizes/deemphasizes observations based on the discussion focus and finally the 
ability to mute or put away certain cards or observations. Next rationale for employing 
the three features and the cognitive limitations they address will be discussed. 
The majority of work on information pooling bias or the hidden profile effect has 
focused on ways to get the team members to discuss the novel information available to 
each of them. The focus has been more on the social and communication aspect of the 
teams and very little on the cognitive aspects. Examination of the cognitive 
underpinnings of this bias, may suggest additional ways to mitigate it. Humans tend to 
easily communicate knowledge or information for which they have developed a good 
mental model and are restrictive in communicating when they are unsure or do not have a 
vivid mental connection for a piece of information or knowledge. When information and 
knowledge are spread across all team members, elaborate searching to find connections 
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would be necessary and it would take a lot of team effort and individual mental effort to 
incorporate all pieces of information to make a good mental model and to make effective 
decisions.    
Software to generate possible connections between team member’s observations 
leveraging individual reports is technically feasible and showing such associations 
between the team member observations would help the individual analysts to make the 
mental connections effortlessly in contrast to making such connections by oneself. This 
can lead to a more constructive discussion incorporating the novel pieces of information 
such as unique events in addition to discussing information that is known to all members 
of the team. 
Presenting the possible associations between team member’s individual 
observations may not ensure that the analysts would discuss all pieces of information 
equally. Humans tend to process information present in their field of vision that only 
affects or are related to their current train of thought. So they might suffer from a 
tunneled focus and spend a lot of time discussing some observations and not give priority 
to others and therefore causing the analysts to still conduct a biased discussion even 
though they have the ability to see other observations and their associations. 
After having discussed certain observations and their connections, analysts as a 
team would be inching towards a satisficing position in which they would be mentally 
overloaded and would be reluctant to work on other observations and associations 
thoroughly. The presence of the discussed observations in their visual field would bias 
them to further discuss those instead of focusing on and discussing a new set of 
observations and associations. When there are two choices with one being the harder 
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option and the other being the easier option we would choose the easier option even if the 
harder option may be the better choice. Here the easier and lower information yielding 
choice would be the observations and associations that have been discussed enough and 
the harder and greater information yielding choice would the observations and 
associations that have not received much focus. The bias to choose the easier low 
information yielding choice instead of the harder high information yielding choice would 
persist unless the easier choice is removed even as a choice. Cutting off the easier choice 
will allow one to start working on options that yield more information. 
When observations can be hidden away from the analyst’s visual field it is a form 
of arriving at a state of closure/completion with those observations and that they would 
stop including them in their subsequent discussions. Hence this would allow the analyst 
teams to work on new observations without being biased about the ones already 
discussed. Allowing analysts to hide or box away the discussed observations would help 
them to focus on and discuss the other observations and associations which would lead to 
more effective decision making. 
Experiment Description 
A human-in-the-loop experiment was conducted to investigate research questions 
1 and 2. In this study, the hypothesis that information pooling bias is present in cyber 
defense analyst teams conducting the forensics task was tested and along with the ability 
of a prototype collaboration tool to mitigate cognitive limitations. The key component of 
the experiment was the discussion that took place between the participants in each 
Mission or trial. There were two discussion session trials. At the start of each session the 
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participants were assigned reports of attack descriptions. They were asked to study the 
report individually for a short duration of 10 minutes. Then during the discussion the 
participants were asked to share and discuss the attack descriptions available to them to 
get the big picture of the network situation at hand. They conducted the discussion either 
by using the report files provided to them in the form of Microsoft PowerPoint or by 
using an off-the-shelf collaboration tool (wiki) or by using the prototype collaborative 
visualization software depending on the experimental condition they were randomly 
assigned. Figure 4 is a pictorial representation of the experiment process. 
 
Figure 4. Summary of the experiment Process 
Participants. Thirty teams comprised of three participants each were recruited to 
work as cyber defense analyst teams in the study for three hours. The three hours 
included the training period, breaks, practice session and the actual experiment trials. The 
participants were recruited through advertisements posted around the university campus 
and through an email list service of the university. The participants were asked to sign-up 
for a date based on their availability. The experimental condition to be run on each date 
was assigned randomly. The participants were given $10 per hour for their participation 
in the experiment. An informed consent form was presented to the participant and they 
were assigned to the experiment only if they provided their consent to participate in the 
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experiment. The participants were then provided the necessary training for performing 
the tasks in the experiment. 
Materials. The training document used by the participants in presented in 
Appendix A and the attack reports used in both Mission 1 and Mission 2 is presented in 
Appendix B. 
Training. Training is crucial because the cyber defense task and the 
terminologies are mostly unfamiliar to a majority of the population. This kind of training 
could reduce to an extent the individual differences between the participants in terms of 
knowledge and skills required to conduct the task. The four main learning objectives 
intended from the training include (1) Become familiar with computer networks and the 
associated terminologies (2) Develop an understanding of how an attacker/hacker can 
attack computer networks (3) Develop an understanding about the different cyber attacks 
used in the experiment (4) Learn how to discuss attacks with others on the team to get a 
big picture view of the network being analyzed. 
 First, the participants were given an overview of the cyber domain including an 
overview on computer networks, the Internet and its basic components such as IP 
address, software ports, and computer devices and how the communication flows 
between devices on the network. All descriptions were presented in a simple and jargon-
less manner using examples such that the participants with little to no-training can 
quickly grasp and comprehend the material presented. They were also frequently quizzed 
to help them reflect the material they have studied. Similarly, the participants were also 
given a description of the network that they were going to analyze during the experiment 
trials and were also given description of how a cyber-attack is carried out, using graphical 
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examples. Then the participants were given descriptions of the cyber attacks used in the 
experiment task and also how to analyze those descriptions. Finally, the training involved 
information on how to conduct a discussion regarding individual observations with other 
team members and on how to make connections between different attack observations to 
detect threats such as multi-step attacks and APT. Such multi-step attacks were defined as 
large scale attacks in the training and the participant teams were instructed that their goal 
was discuss and detect attacks happening at a larger scale. The participants were given a 
15-minute break after the training session. 
Experimental Missions. After training and the subsequent break, the participants 
performed one short practice Mission for hands on experience at conducting a forensic 
discussion by reading the attack observations assigned to them and conducting a 
discussion on them later. After the practice Mission, the participants were shown an 
animated video with motivational background music describing their task and goals in the 
context of a military Mission. Such a back story was provided to get the teams to perform 
their tasks with some level of motivation. Later, the participants performed two trials of 
discussion based on the attack descriptions assigned to them.  
During the discussion trials, each participant was assigned separate reports that 
contained a list of attack evidence descriptions. Each attack description contained the 
name of the attack, type of attack, time of attack, attack methodology, information/file 
involved in the attack and source and destination machine IP address. This simulates 
reports generated by cyber defense analysts in the real world. The reports assigned to 
each participant were different from each other, but each contained eight attack 
descriptions to analyze and discuss for experimental control.  
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The reports assigned to each participant were carefully constructed such that a 
majority of the attacks and the corresponding descriptions with each participant was 
associated with two or three fictional large scale attacks happening at a certain part of a 
fictional network. As per the scenario, there will be similar such fictional attacks 
happening at other parts of the network and the evidence for those attacks were assigned 
to other team members. Such attacks were termed shared attacks in the experiment. 
Additionally for each participant there were also clues of attacks that were disconnected 
from the rest of the attacks and seemed like isolated events happening in that part of the 
network. However such attacks were also constructed to be part of a large scale attack 
spanning different sub-networks and the clues about such attacks were spread across all 
three members of the team. Such attacks were termed unique attacks. There were also 
alerts that were indeed isolated and had no connection whatsoever with other 
observations and alerts available with other team members and were simply termed as 
isolated attacks.  
Each participant received four shared attacks, two unique attacks, and two 
isolated attacks totaling eight attack descriptions per team member. Figure 5 shows the 
distribution of the attack description per member analyst. As shown in Figure 5, there are 
five shared attacks of which all three participants each receive one copy of the two shared 
attacks and the remaining three shared attacks are shared by two of three team members. 
To clarify, as show in Figure 5 descriptions of shared attack 1 and 2 are shared among all 
three team members whereas description of shared attack 3 is shared between analyst 1 
and 2, description of shared attack 4 is shared between analyst 2 and 3 and finally 
description of shared attack 5 is shared between analyst 3 and 1. Then there are two large 
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scale multi-step attacks which are represented in Figure 5 as unique A and unique B. 
There are three unique attacks that are part of each of these two large scale attacks 
represented as unique A1 to unique A3 and unique B1 to unique B3. These six unique 
attacks are equally distributed among all three team members such that each person has 
one part of the large scale attack needed to detect it. Finally, there are two isolated attacks 
per team member which are in no way connected to attacks in other participants. Each 
attack type is represented by a different shape in the Figure 5. In total there are five 


































The participants had to discuss thoroughly, pooling all the information available 
to them, to find these connections and identifying large scale attacks whereas the 
evidence to detect other attacks were available to each of the team members and was 
conspicuous. 
The participants were instructed that they would be reading descriptions of 
fictional network attacks observed. The participants were then asked to discuss, identify 
and report at the end all of the large scale attacks they detected through their discussion. 
They were also asked to ignore reporting the isolated attacks. They were then alerted to 
the fact that the reports were not identical and that there could be similarities and 
connections between their individual reports.  
The training, attack reports, the tools, the measurements and the whole procedure 
was refined and practiced through several rounds of pilot testing. Emphasis was given to 
making the training material comprehensive, but at the same time concise and simple 
enough for all participants to understand and use the knowledge gained in conducting the 
task. Emphasis was also given to refining the attack descriptions. Attack descriptions had 
to be constructed to be at a good level of difficulty such that it was neither too easy nor 
too difficult to discuss and detect the large scale attacks in the Mission. 
The aim of the experiment was to observe and measure whether the participants 
incorporate all of the information into their discussion and in making decisions and also 
whether they identify the large scale attack by pooling and fusing evidence that is spread 
across all the members of the team. They were also advised to take notes during the 
discussion to help them recall their findings to report at the end. They were given 25 
minutes to discuss and at the end of the 25 minute duration the participants as a team 
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reported their findings. They were given 10 minute break and refreshments between the 
two trials. 
Experiment Design. As shown in Table 1, the experiment was a 3X2 mixed 
factorial design. Type of tool was one of the independent variables with three levels. For 
each type of experimental condition, the participants performed two trials of discussion (a 
within subjects variable). All participant teams irrespective of the experimental condition 
conducted the discussion using Microsoft PowerPoint during the first trial. The data from 
the first trial served as the baseline measure of performance and baseline communication 
data. During Trial 2, the participant teams in the first experimental condition or control 
condition again used Microsoft PowerPoint for conducting the discussion whereas 
participant teams in the second experimental condition used DocuWiki, a wiki 
application, during the discussion and finally participant teams in the third experiment 
condition used the prototype collaborative visualization tool. 
Table 1. Experiment Design of the experiment 
 
Measures  
Performance. Team Detection Performance was based on the total number of 
attacks correctly identified and this was broken down by total number of shared attacks 
and total number of unique attacks detected.  These numbers were based on the team 
report provided at the end. The report had a low chance of any confounds with memory 
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recall errors because during their report they used their notes from the discussion, had 
access to their attack descriptions and were not constrained by time.  
Collaboration. To measure the team’s focus of the discussion (Stasser & Stewart 
1992), the team’s communication during the discussion was coded in real-time by 
experimenters. Three experimenters were given a simple interface as shown in Figure 6 
with buttons representing the eight attack descriptions per analyst. The coders were 
instructed to listen to the discussion and in real-time, based on the attack description 
being discussed, click on the respective buttons. Each click was recorded as one 
statement of the attack description in the discussion. The coders had around two to three 
weeks of practice doing this task while the experiment was pilot-tested. The practice 
included listening to the conversation and also clicking on the appropriate buttons.  
 
Figure 6. Screenshot of the communication coder interface 
Such online coding methodology avoided the need to conduct any post-
experiment communication coding, though the audio records were available if there were 
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any questions. Then communication coded identified the number of times the participants 
mentioned each attack description (including attacks unique to them). Then the number 
of times each attack type (shared, unique and isolated) was mentioned 𝑋𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 was 
also computed. Also the total number of times all the attack descriptions were mentioned 
 𝑋𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 was calculated. All the measures were at the team level.  
𝑋𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 =  ∑ 𝑀𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝑋𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 =  ∑ 𝑀𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒
 
Where AttackType = {Shared, Unique, Isolated} 
Then a percentage P of each attack type (shared, unique and isolated) mentioned 




 × 100 
This serves as a measure of the discussion focus for each kind of attack 
description.  These measures were termed shared percent, unique percent and isolated 
percent for focus on shared type of attack, unique type of attacks (multi-step) and isolated 
type of attacks respectively.  
Workload. In addition the NASA TLX workload questionnaire was administered 






HUMAN-IN-THE-LOOP EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
As described in the previous section, two main types of measures were collected 
from the experiment and analyzed. They include measures of performance and discussion 
focus. In addition, workload measures were collected once for each team at the end of the 
session and analyzed. The performance measure components include overall attack 
detection performance, performance in detecting attacks observed by two or more 
members of the team (termed as shared attacks), and performance in detecting attacks 
observed by only one of the team members, but which is associated with others attacks 
observed by other members of team because they are part of large scale attack (termed as 
unique attacks). The discussion focus measures included the percentage of discussion that 
involved discussing information shared by two or more members of the team (shared 
percent) and the percentage of discussion that involved discussing information that is 
only uniquely available to individual members of the team (unique percent). Workload 
measures included participant judgments of mental load, physical load and temporal load.  
The analysis of the experimental results have been organized into four main 
sections. First, the descriptive statistics for the two main measures (performance and 
discussion focus) for each Mission are presented and across Mission and conditions are 
presented. Then a MANOVA was conducted for each mission to detect how the 
measured varied in each mission. Analysis was done in this manner because in Mission 1 
no interventions were employed whereas in Mission 2 interventions were employed. 
Then relevant comparisons as required were conducted. Finally, analysis on the workload 
measures is presented. 
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Table 2 presents the descriptives of the discussion focus measures shared percent, 
unique percent and overall detection performance in Mission 1 and Mission 2 by 
combining the data from all three conditions (in other words data from all teams 
irrespective of the experimental condition) in each Mission. Skewness and kurtosis 
measures, as shown in Table 2, are calculated in terms of z value. For both Missions and 
for all three measures it is between -1.96 and 1.96 and therefore it can be inferred that the 
distribution of the data is normal and does not violate assumptions of normality. 
Table 2. Descriptives of discussion focus and overall performance measure with Z values of 
skewness and Kurtosis  
 
In Mission 1 all teams in all three conditions used only Microsoft PowerPoint 
slides during their discussions. However, in Mission 2, based on the experimental 
condition, teams in different conditions used different tools during their discussion where 
teams in the slide condition used PowerPoint slides, teams in Wiki condition used a wiki 
application and teams in the visualization condition used the visualization.  
From the Table 2, it can be seen that mean percentage of shared information in 
Mission1 (combining data from all teams) is 63.1% whereas in Mission 2 it is 60.2%. 
Next, as it can be seen from the Table 2, mean percentage of unique information in the 









Mission 1 30 63.1 7.09 -0.34 0.99
Mission 2 30 60.2 10.8 -1.46 1.67
Mission 1 30 16.3 5.8 1.6 0.76
Mission 2 30 22.08 8.9 1.7 -0.01
Mission 1 30 11.3 2.05 -0.05 -0.84






detection performance in Mission 1 is 11.3 attacks out of 18 possible attacks whereas in 
Mission 2 it is 12.44 attacks.  
Table 3. Descriptives of the discussion focus and overall performance measures in Mission 1 
 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the discussion focus measures: 
shared percent and unique percent, and the overall detection performance in Mission 1 by 
the three conditions. Mission1 was designed to be the baseline condition for detecting the 
presence of information pooling bias in cyber defense analyst teams. The descriptives 
presented in Table 3 show that the mean of all measures in all teams across all three 
conditions is very similar. These results show that participant teams while performing the 
cyber-attack detection and forensics analysis focused majorly on discussing shared 
information (around 60%) compared to the unique information (around 15%). The 
remainder of their discussion was focused on the noise data.  
Table 4. Correlation between discussion focus measures and overall performance in Mission 1  
 
N Mean Median Standard Deviation
Slide condition 10 60.5 61.2 5.03
Wiki condition 10 64.5 65 4.2
Visual condition 10 64.3 65.2 10.6
Slide condition 10 17.1 16.6 5.8
Wiki condition 10 15.2 16.7 5.4
Visual condition 10 16.6 15.3 6.56
Slide condition 10 10.7 10.5 1.56
Wiki condition 10 11.9 12 2.28





















Sig. (2-tailed) 0.022 0.038





Table 4 shows the correlation between the discussion focus measures and the 
detection performance measure. As it can be seen from table 4, the shared percent 
measure was significantly negatively correlated with performance (r(88)=-0.417) 
indicating that higher the focus on discussing shared information lesser was the 
performance. The unique percent measure was positively correlated with the performance 
(r(88)=0.380) which indicates that higher the focus on discussing unique information 
higher was the performance. 
Table 5. Descriptives of the discussion focus and overall performance measures in Mission 2  
 
Participants in Mission 2 used different tools in each condition during their 
discussion. In the slide condition, participants used Microsoft power point slide, in wiki 
condition, participants used the wiki software and in the visualization condition, 
participants used a custom developed visualization during their discussion. Table 5 
presents the descriptive statistics for the discussion focus measures: shared percent and 




N Mean Median Standard Deviation
Slide condition 10 63.14 61.39 5.4
Wiki condition 10 67.2 66.09 8.02
Visual condition 10 50.29 50.17 10.46
Slide condition 10 18.51 18.41 5.2
Wiki condition 10 17.4 18.03 6.09
Visual condition 10 30.14 31.92 9.2
Slide condition 10 11.4 12 2.5
Wiki condition 10 11.8 12 1.3








Table 6. Correlation discussion focus measures and overall performance in Mission 2  
 
Table 6 shows the correlation between the discussion focus measures and the 
detection performance measure in Mission 2 and as can be seen in Table 6, the results 
obtained are on par with correlation results found in Mission 1 data wherein the shared 
percent measure is again significantly negatively correlated with performance (r(88)=-
0.450) indicating that the higher focus on discussing shared information lesser the 
performance. Also the unique percent measure is significantly positively correlated with 
the performance (r(88)=0.585) indicating that the higher the unique information 
discussed higher is the performance. As it can be seen, the correlation between the unique 
percent measure and overall performance is more strongly correlated in Mission 2 
(r=0.585) in comparison to Mission 1 (r=0.38). 
Thus far the descriptives were presented by each Mission but it is also important 
to look at how each measure fared across the two Missions and across the three 
conditions. 
Towards that, first a mixed ANOVA was conducted on discussion focus 
measures: shared percent and unique percent and the performance measures to see the 
effect of the different interventions introduced in Mission 2 in comparison to Mission1 
where all the teams used PowerPoint slides during their discussion. Therefore the within-
subjects factor was the Mission and the between-subjects factor was the condition.  
Shared_percent Unique_percent Detection_Perf













Sig. (2-tailed) 0.013 0.001





The mixed ANOVA on shared percent revealed that there was a significant 
interaction effect (F=10.285, p<0.01). This means that percentage of shared information 
in the discussion significantly varied between the Missions as a function of the condition. 
Figure 7 shows the comparison of mean shared percent measure across both Missions and 
three experimental conditions. As it can be seen in Figure 7, there is drop in shared 
percentage in Mission 2 in the visualization condition whereas there is an increase in 
shared information percentage in Mission 2 in the slide and wiki condition. 
 
Figure 7. Bar graphs of shared percentage measure across both Missions and three conditions 
Similarly, the mixed ANOVA on unique percent revealed that there was a 
significant interaction effect (F=5.589, p<0.009). This means that percentage of unique 
information in the discussion significantly varied between the Missions as a function of 
the condition. Figure 8 shows the comparison of unique percent measure across both 
Missions and three experimental condition. As it can be seen in Figure 8, there is an 
increase in focus on unique information in Mission 2 in all three conditions but the 
increase in visual condition seems greater. 
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Figure 8. Bar graphs of unique percentage measure across both Missions and three conditions 
The mixed ANOVA on overall detection performance revealed a non-significant 
interaction effect (F=3.136, p=0.060). Figure 9 shows the comparison of overall detection 
performance measure across both Missions and three experimental condition.  
 
Figure 9. Graphs of detection performance across both Missions and three conditions 
Since the interaction effect on the overall detection performance was non-
significant, the overall detection performance was broken down to its constituents: 
performance from detecting shared attacks and performance from detecting unique 
attacks. The mixed ANOVA on detection performance of shared attacks revealed that 
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there was a non-significant effect interaction effect (F=0.480, p=0.960) whereas mixed 
ANOVA on detection performance of unique attacks revealed that there was a significant 
interaction effect (F=10.082, p=0.001). As shown in Figure 10, there is an increase in 
number of unique attacks detected in Mission 2 in the visualization condition and the 
slide condition. However there number of unique attacks detected in Mission 2 in the 
wiki condition decreases. Therefore, hereon, analysis will be done on both overall 
detection performance and its constituents. 
 
Figure 10. Graphs of performance on unique attacks across both Missions and conditions 
Next a MANOVA was conducted for each mission to investigate the effect of 
condition on discussion focus measure and performance in each mission. A Multivariate 
ANOVA was conducted across the three conditions in Mission 1. The multivariate test 
(Hotelling's Trace) yielded a non-significant result: F(8,46)=1.074, p=0.398, partial ῃ2 = 
0.157. This result indicates that the variables did not vary significantly across the three 
groups in Mission1 which is the desired outcome: no significant differences in team's 
discussion focus or in their performance and that all the teams in Mission 1 focused 




Figure 12. Bar graphs of discussion focus and performance measures in Mission1 
As shown in figure 12, in all three conditions the team spent the majority (around 
60 %) of their focus discussing shared information whereas only spent around 15% to 
17% of their focus discussing the unique information. This bias is reflected in the 
performance. As shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11, most of the performance outcome is 
in detecting the shared attacks, whereas they detected only few unique attacks.  
Then a Multivariate ANOVA was conducted across the three groups in Mission 2. 
The multivariate test (Hotelling's Trace) yielded a significant result: F(8,46)=3.341 
p=0.004, partial ῃ2 = 0.368. This result indicates that there is a significant difference in 
the team's discussion focus and in their performance in Mission 2. As it can be seen in 
Table 7 and Figure 13, in the slide and wiki conditions, around 65% of the team’s 
discussion focus was on shared information whereas they only 18% of the discussion 
focus was on discussing the unique information.  
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Figure 13. Bar graphs of discussion focus and performance measures in Mission 2 
Mean Std. Deviation N
Slide 63.15 5.41 10
Wiki 67.20 8.03 10
Visual 50.29 10.47 10
Slide 18.52 5.23 10
Wiki 17.41 6.09 10
Visual 30.15 9.24 10
Slide 11.40 2.59 10
Wiki 11.80 1.40 10
Visual 14.20 3.12 10
Slide 9.60 2.12 10
Wiki 11.00 1.33 10
Visual 10.50 1.72 10
Slide 1.80 1.40 10
Wiki 0.80 1.03 10

















However it can be seen that teams in the visualization condition spent 50% of 
their focus discussing the shared information and spent around 30% of their focus 
discussing the unique information. As it can be seen from Table 7 and Figure 13 the bias 
is reflected in the performance in wiki and slide conditions where most of the 
performance outcome is in detecting the shared attacks (around 11.6 attacks); whereas 
they have detected only few unique attacks (around 1.3 attacks).  
To further investigate the extent of difference detected in the variables in Mission 
2, a test of between subjects effect on individual variables across the three conditions in 
Mission 2 was conducted.  
Table 8. Results of the between-subjects analysis on discussion focus and performance measures 
in Mission 2 by the three conditions  
 
As shown in Table 8, discussion focus measures: shared percent (F=11.5, p<0.01) 
and unique percent (F=9.9, p=0.01) varied significantly, overall detection performance 
varied significantly (F=3.7, p=0.037), detection performance of the shared attacks did not 













Shared Percent 1559.288 2 779.644 11.507 .000 .460 23.014 .987
Unique Percent 995.350 2 497.675 9.963 .001 .425 19.927 .973
Detection Performance
Total
45.867 2 22.933 3.739 .037 .217 7.478 .634
Detection Performance
Shared Attacks
10.067 2 5.033 1.639 .213 .108 3.279 .315
Detection Performance 
Unique Attacks




varied significantly (F=7.5, p=0.002). This shows that the variance in the overall 
performance comes from the variance in detection of the unique attacks. 
Now to investigate how the teams in the three conditions in Mission 2 fared 
between each other, a pairwise comparison of each variable (that was found to 
significantly vary) between all pairs of conditions: slides, wiki and visualization was 
conducted. As highlighted in Table 9 the variables: shared percent, unique percent and 
the detection performance on unique attacks in the visualization condition varied 
significantly from the slide and the wiki condition. However as it can be seen in Table 9, 
there is no significant difference between the conditions slide and wiki in Mission 2 for 
any of the variables.  
Table 9. Multiple comparison on the measures in Mission 2  
  
The NASA TLX workload questionnaire was administered at the end of the 
experiment (after Mission 2). A multivariate analysis was performed on responses to the 
NASA TLX workload questionnaire. No significant difference (F(26,148) = 1.009, 




Slide Wiki -4.05 0.52
Wiki Visual -16.91 <0.01
Slide Visual -12.86 <0.01
Slide Wiki 1.1 1
Wiki Visual -12.73 <0.01
Slide Visual -11.62 <0.01
Slide Wiki -0.4 1
Wiki Visual -2.4 0.09
Slide Visual -2.8 0.04
Slide Wiki 1 0.39
Wiki Visual -2.9 <0.01










This is a desired outcome as the introduction of the visualization did not increase their 
cognitive work load, nor did it seem to decrease it.  All the measures except for physical 
stress and across all three conditions averaged around 7 with the maximum being 10 and 
minimum being 1. Hence it can be deduced that the participants perceived the task in 
general to be of high workload. The physical stress averaged around 3 which means that  
the participants perceived the task to less stressful physically. 















AGENT BASED MODEL 
Premise 3 
To represent such an information sharing paradigm computationally, both the 
team level social process that primes the analyst to search their memory for a piece of 
information to contribute to the current discussion and the cognitive process that the 
analysts use to look for that information piece must be considered. Because by default the 
members of a team would not discuss novel information enough, an assumption could be 
made that they could be using a heuristic search process internally with the goal of the 
search process being to communicate only information that validates or conforms to the 
current team discussion. Taking a deductive approach, such a search process can be 
represented in the model using meta-heuristics such as local search and hill climbing 
where the result of the search process in combination with the social process that 
encourage such a search process leads to sub-optimal solutions. Then such assumptions 
could be tested by running simulations and comparing them against the empirical data. 
Research Questions 3 
Can the cognitive process used by analysts to search and retrieve information that leads 
to a biased team discussion be represented in the agent-based model using heuristic 
search algorithms such as Hill climbing and local search? 
Hypothesis 3 
I hypothesize that, human analysts are using simple heuristics to search for information 
to contribute during a biased team discussion 
Rationale. Heuristics are used instead of traditional algorithms when the optimal 
solution is computationally very expensive and that it is satisfactory to achieve sub-
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optimal solutions. This could be the case with human teams when they discuss the shared 
information more often because communicating and finding connections between novel 
pieces of information is computationally expensive for humans and they are happy with 
achieving a sub-optimal solution using the shared information. Hence meta-heuristics 
such as hill climbing and local search algorithms can be used to represent the internal 
cognitive search process in combination with the external social stimuli motivating 
agents to search locally would represent such an information sharing paradigm.  
Other memory based meta-heuristics such as the “tabu search” use memories of 
past searches to decide whether to search a certain search space again or move to 
different location in the search space to search for new optimums. This is similar to the 
expectation from teams conducting information pooling in which they search and 
communicate all pieces of information equally to achieve optimum solutions.  
Research Question 3A 
What type of model predicts the discussion pattern and performance of cyber defense 
analysts conducting a less biased team discussion? Is it memory-aided meta-heuristics? 
Hypothesis 3A 
I hypothesize that, memory-aided based meta-heuristics, will better represent the 
discussion pattern and performance of cyber defense analysts conducting a less biased 
team discussion 
Rationale. When the agents can move around the search space so that they are 
not confined to local maxima it would mean they search other pieces of information to 
communicate as well, which is representative of the less biased team discussion. Hence 
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heuristics with memory aids to conduct such a search would represent the less biased 
team discussion.  
Premise 3B 
Agent-based modelling has traditionally been used to study several social 
processes with very little to no importance given to modeling the cognitive underpinnings 
of the agents. Through this work I am displaying the advantage of modelling the 
cognitive aspects of the agents in addition to the social processes to study the agent 
phenomenon in a more comprehensive manner so that it represents team cognition 
experiment conducted with human subjects in the lab.  
Research Question 3B 
Can agent-based models replicate the empirical results from experiments conducted with 
humans? 
Hypothesis 3B 
I hypothesize that, the results acquired by running an agent-based model that represents 
the key cognitive aspects of the human subjects will closely align with and predict the 
results obtained from the human-in-the-loop experiments. 
To investigate the research 3 along with its sub-questions 3A, and 3B an agent-
based model was developed.  
Model Design 
The model has four kinds of entities: Cyber defense analysts, their individual 
memory space, attack information and a social space. The individual memory space 
represents the human memory that has the pieces of information for agents to 
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communicate during a team discussion. The social space represents the information 
pooling happening at the team level during team discussions. Attack information 
represents a piece of attack description used by analysts in discussion and subsequently 
used to detect the attack itself. As shown in Figure 14, the cyber defense analysts and the 
attack information in the model are represented using agents. Both the memory space and 
the social space are represented using patches. Memory space and the social space are 
dimensionless and is simply representative of spaces in the head (ITH) and between the 
heads (BTH) respectively. 
 
Figure 14. Snapshot of the model interface showing 3 colored quadrants representing individual 


















The whole rectangular patch space is divided into 4 quadrants. One quadrant of 
patches is assigned to each of the three cyber defense analysts as memory space and the 
remaining fourth quadrant is made the social space which is to capture the social 
interaction happening between the agents. As shown Figure 14, all three agents are put 
near the center of the entire rectangular patch space close to each other and at the border 
of their individual memory space. The four quadrants described are shown in the Figure 
14 with each patch color representing the memory space of the three different analyst 
agents. 
 
Based on the parameters, total number of attacks and number of information 
pieces per attack, information pieces describing the attacks, are generated. Attack 
information is an agent breed that has state variables such as the attack type, attack 
number, attack information number, the percentage of information the attack information 
offers in detecting the overall attack, and a variable to track number of times it is 
mentioned. The number of attack information pieces per attack kind is based on attack 
type percentage parameter where the shared attack percent gives the percentage of shared 
Input Parameter 1: Total number of attacks to be detected 
Input Parameter 2: Number of Information pieces per attack 
Input Parameter 3: Percentage of each attack type 
Assumption 1: Each cyber-attack will have some number of information pieces and 
the human analyst needs to integrate these information pieces to comprehend the 
attack and to make good judgments about its connections to other attacks observed 
by others in the team. 
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attacks with regard to the total number of attacks, and similarly the unique percent gives 
the percentage of unique attacks.  
  
In the model, the analyst agent has two main state variables: patch boundaries of 
its memory space and capacity of its short-term memory. The locations of memory space 
are in discrete units of x and y coordinates of the Netlogo patches. There are in turn two 
parts to the memory space: (1) memory locations that are closer which are easily 
accessible and have information that have been consolidated by the agent. This is 
represented on the interface with light shaded patches (2) memory locations that are far, 
difficult to access, and that contain disparate information require several rounds of 
searching to reach. This is represented with darker shade patches. Both the closer and 
farther memory is shown in the Figure 14. 
 
Different search models (Random, Local or Memory-aided) are compared. Based 
on the chosen search model, the agent's search behavior to find information in its memory 
space varies. The total number of attacks detected and amount of mentioning of each kind 
of attack information during the discussion is compared between these different search 
models. 
Assumption 2: Human memory is a space in the brain and this space has parts that 
are easily accessible to the individual and then there are parts that require more 
effort to access.  
 
 
Input Parameter 4: Search Model – Random, Local or Memory-aided local search 
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The random search model is used as null model for comparison. The remaining 
two models (Local and Memory-aided) are hypothesized to be representative of the two 
conditions (Biased and Less-Biased) tested in the experiment. As shown in Figure 15, the 
five cells (represented in yellow) in the experimental design for which the participants 
used slides or wiki software involved biased discussion whereas the one cell (represented 
in green) for which the participants used visualization involved less-biased discussion. 
The local search model is hypothesized (Hypothesis 3) to be representative of the five 
cells (in yellow) of biased condition in the experiment. The memory-aided local search 
model is hypothesized (Hypothesis 2) to be representative of the one cell of less-biased 
condition in the experiment (in green). 
 
                                             
                      
                                  
Figure 15. The three search models and the two mapped experiment conditions 
The goal of the agents is to detect all the attacks. To detect an attack, the agents as 
a team have to integrate the attack information pieces belonging to an attack from each 
agent's memory space. To accomplish this, the agents must sense the ongoing team 
discussion, search for relevant information pieces in its own memory space and 




No Tool - Slide Based No Tool - Slide Based
No Tool - Slide Based Wiki
No Tool - Slide Based Visualization
Biased Condition Less-biased Condition 







information pieces contributed are integrated and evaluated to know if the attack is 
detected.  
The model is run for a maximum of 15000 ticks or until all the attacks are found. 
Every tick in the model represents one tenth of a second. So 10 ticks represents one 
second, 600 ticks represent 1 minute and 15000 ticks represents 25 minutes which is the 
duration of discussion in the complimentary human-in-the-loop experiment. Instead, 
considering one tick as one second and therefore 1500 ticks in total is a small duration for 
model execution. Therefore 15000 ticks was chosen 
Process overview and scheduling 
 The overall simulation process involves three phases: Setup, Read and Discuss 
similar to the human-in-the-loop experiment.  
The simulation begins with setup phase which involves the creation of agents, 
patches and also the distribution of information pieces for each kind of attack on the 
memory space of each cyber defense agent. The information at this stage is distributed to 
random locations on far side of the memory space (represented by dark shade patches on 
the interface). There are attack information pieces that are shared among all three agents 
and then there are information pieces that are uniquely available to each agent and finally 
there are information pieces which represent isolated attacks. Isolated attacks are simply 
noise and therefore no analysis was performed on that attack kind. The number of attack 
clues in the model is similar to that of the experiment. The shared clues represent the 
conspicuous attacks often seen in the networks, whereas the unique clues represent the 
large scale stealth attacks such as the APTs. Below is pseudo code of the setup process, 




After the setup phase, agents read the attack information pieces in their memory 
space as in the experiment. Each agent is assigned a short-term memory capacity based 
on Miller's work on short-term memory (Miller, 1956). Based on one's capacity, agents 
temporarily stores in their short-term memory the attack information pieces being read 
and when related information appears in the memory, the agent moves it to one of the 
closer memory space locations and also moves the associated evidence to one of its 
neighboring locations, thereby consolidating the attack information pieces in its memory 
space.  
During discussions, team members have to use their recognition memory 
(Atkinson & Juola, 1974) to recognize the information being discussed and use that as a 
reference to find internally the relevant information to contribute to the discussion. 
However, when visual aids are used, they can augment this recognition memory and can 
help in locating the relevant information more quickly and easily.  
Setup 
Create 3 Agents (Cyber Defense Analyst) 
 Create 3 Memory Spaces 




  where Attack Type = {Shared, Unique, Isolated} 
 Create attack information pieces for each attack type created 
 Distribute the attack information pieces to Each Memory Space 
End 
 
Assumption 3: When we read information, we consolidate the different parts 
of information and we store it in our memory in a way that is easy to 
accessible during future retrieval 
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 To represent such an augmented human recognition memory in the model, each 
agent's memory space is mapped into four quadrants. This mapping will be used by the 
memory-aided local search model to quickly locate the region where certain attack 
information can be found instead of searching for it in a strictly uphill manner. Such an 
augmented recognition memory structure will be used by agents in the memory-aided 
local search model as it is hypothesized to represent the less-biased experimental 
condition in which visualization was used. Towards this, each agent creates a list of 
attack information pieces present in its memory space along with pointers to the mapped 
region in its memory space where it is present. As shown in Figure 16, each agent has a 
list of attack information pieces and each entry in the list has a pointer to a list which has 
the list of region identifier for the agent to lookup while searching for that attack 
information. 
 
Figure 16. Representation of the recognition memory structure 
 















for each attack 
information 
Read 
 Each agent loops through each attack information in its Memory space 
 If the attack information matches another piece already in memory  
            Move both information pieces closer to each other and also closer to the center 
 End IF 
 -----Build the Recognition Memory---- 
 Divide the Each Memory space further into 4 quadrants 




After reading, the discussion session begins. At the start of discussion phase, one 
analyst agent will be randomly picked to initiate discussion by triggering the agent to 
start the search process and to copy attack information it finds from its memory space to 
the social space. The search process employed by the analyst agent is based on the chosen 
search model: Random, Local Search or Memory-aided local search. The next agent in 
the order (agent 1 -> 2 -> 3 ->1) will be chosen to contribute towards the discussion 
during the next tick. The chosen agent in the next tick will again use the chosen search 
process to find attack information to add to the discussion. It would do two rounds of 
search to find relevant attack information to contribute to the social space. There are two 
outcomes to a search process: agent finds relevant information or agent does not find 
relevant information. If the agent fails to find relevant information it does not contribute 
anything to the space during the tick. On the other hand, if the agent finds relevant 
information then the agent copies it to the social space. It is then determined if the 
information pieces now present in the social space accounts to 90% of the information 
needed to detect the attack. If so, it is noted that the attack is detected and the social space 
is cleared, to make way for new discussions. Then the discussion will be handed over to 
the next randomly chosen agent. The agent in the next tick will look at the social space to 
see if there is an existing discussion and if there is a discussion ongoing in the social 
space the agent will perform the assigned search again to determine the attack 
information to contribute to the discussion. This continues until all the attacks are 
discovered or if the simulation completes 15000 ticks. The flowchart in Figure 17 




































Figure 17. Flow chart of the discussion phase in the model 
 
 
The three search models compared are random search, local search and memory 
search. In random search model, at each tick the agent moves to a random location in its 
memory space to find relevant information pieces to contribute to the current discussion. 
The agent attempts twice to find relevant information for the discussion.  
Go 
 Run until 15000 ticks (represents 25 minutes) or until all attacks are detected 
 If social Space empty 
  Randomly choose an agent 
  Ask the chosen agent to initiate discussion 
  If model = Memory-aided local search [choose pieces of attacks not 
detected] 
  Else [Choose one of the piece of attack in the closer memory] 
 Else 
  Choose the next Analyst 
If model = Random Search [Perform Random Search] 
If model = Local Search [Perform Local Search] 
If model = Memory-aided local search [Perform Memory-aided local 
search] 
Evaluate the social space 




In local search model, at each tick the agent looks at its neighboring locations to 
find relevant information pieces to contribute to the current discussion. If there are no 
relevant information pieces in its immediate vicinity, it moves one step at a time in an 
uphill manner in the direction of the relevant information pieces. This uphill movement 
ensures that the agent will find some relevant information in the near future. 
 
In the memory-aided local search model, the agents are given access to the 
recognition memory structure. To contribute to the discussion, the agent, using the 
recognition memory structure, moves to one of the regions containing the information. 
Random Search 
 Repeat twice 
  Move to a random location in the Memory space 
If there is relevant information in the location  
 Contribute the information to the discussion 
End Repeat 
End IF 




       Identify neighboring information that was not mentioned in the last 
instance 
       If discussion relevant information was found 
Contribute the information to the discussion 
End Repeat 
        Else 
  Face towards the locations where relevant information is present in the 
space 
  Move 1 step in that direction (to avoid moving up hill in random 
direction)  
       End IF  
 End Repeat 
End 
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The recognition memory structure is represented in Figure 16. After moving to the 
region, it does local search again to find the relevant information pieces for contributing 
to the discussion. Such a usage of recognition memory structure represents the 
stimulation of recognition memory by the visual aid. Also in this model, the agents have 
access to information on attacks that have been already discussed and therefore avoid 
initiating a discussion on attacks that has already been discussed. This represents a 
closure aid provided by the visualization tool in which the users are allowed to hide 
information pieces of the attacks already detected. 
 
Each attack agent breed carries a variable for the percentage of information the 
attack information offers in detecting the attack. This variable's value ranges between 1 
and 100. The value of this variable (Yk) assigned to each information of an attack (Ai) is 
such that the sum of this variable across all the information pieces of an attack results in 
100 (representing 100 percent of information). ∑ 𝑌𝑘𝐴𝑖  = 100 where 'i' is the attack number 
and 'k' is the number of information under each attack. At the end of every successful 
search and after a new information is contributed to the discussion, the elements in the 
social space are evaluated to determine if the current set of attack information pieces 
account for 100% of the attack information. If 100% of attack information is accounted, it 
is determined that the team of agents has detected the attack and therefore clears the 
Memory-aided local search 
 Look up the recognition memory table  
Find the sub-quadrant of the Memory space where relevant information is 
present 
Move to one of the location in the sub-quadrant 
Perform Local Search in the sub-quadrant 
End 
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social space to make way for new discussions. The current discussion continues if 100% 
of the attack information has not been contributed. In the case of shared attack kind, there 
are identical copies of the information pieces in all three memory spaces and hence all 
three agents have to contribute to the attack information to detect the shared attack. 
However all three agents do not have to contribute the 100% of information because once 
an agent contributes most of the information, the others agents simply have to confirm 
the presence of such information to detect the shared attack. Therefore instead of 
evaluating the summation to 300 (3 * 100), it is evaluated whether the contribution sums 
up to 270 and if so it is determined that the shared attack has been detected.  
 
Design concepts 
Basic Principle. The model is based on the theory that teams by default tend to 
communicate information that is commonly known to all members of the team and fail to 
incorporate the novel pieces of information or the expert information in making team 
level discussion (Stasser & Titus 1985). Such an information pooling bias has been 
observed in many kinds of teams, but hasn’t been investigated it in cyber defense teams 
where the type of information and the nature of information foraging and fusing are 
distinct from other types of teams. Past work on this bias has looked at the social aspects 
of the team in understanding the factors that cause the bias, but has not focused on the 
Evaluation 
If 100 percent of attack is discussed 
  Increment Found Attack 
  End Discussion 




cognitive underpinnings such as cognitive load, lack of perception about the information 
distribution and also the cognitive tunneling that leads to discussing and exploring 
information that is available with majority of the team members. Through this model we 
represent the cognitive search process and social priming that contribute to the bias.  
Emergence. Agents are coded rules to look at the social space to search and 
contribute to the discussion. The local search process causes agents to look at common 
information initially and often thereafter because it is allocated closer to the agent and 
causes the agent to not perceive the novel information that is allocated far away in the 
memory space. This represents the internal process of team members demonstrating such 
a bias. The agents might reach the novel information, but this would require a lot of effort 
and is unlikely to happen often. Also, the agents might initiate a discussion with the novel 
information, but the other agents search location might be different and would be unable 
to reach to associated information using local search and even with few search rounds 
they would not have anything to contribute causing the agent to move on to other 
discussions. The restricted number of rounds of the search process represents the 
cognitive workload limitation. The whole simulation will be run for 15000 ticks and not 
for infinite time because the discussion in the real world has temporal constraints. So 
such simple rules will lead to an emergent phenomenon where the agents will more often 
discuss the common information and though they would reach the novel information it 
would not be discussed enough because at that point other agents would be looking at 
other information. Unless it leads to discussion, decisions will not be made using the 
novel information. 
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Adaptation. If the agent senses that there is an ongoing discussion in the social 
space then the agent will base its search process on the information present in the social 
space or the agent will initiate a discussion by using the information that is available 
close to its last search location. If there was no contribution to the discussion, the agent 
initiated then the agent will move to another space to start a new discussion using the 
information in its neighboring locations. To jump to a new space the agent would use 
random walk type search procedures.  
Objectives. At each tick the objective of the agent is to find information to 
contribute to the ongoing discussion in the social space and also to detect the attack being 
discussed. 
Learning. The agents at the beginning will read and consolidate the attack 
evidence.  
Sensing. The agent senses the information present in the social space to conduct 
the internal local search process to find relevant information. 
Interaction. The analyst agent hands off the discussion to the next agent in the 
order. The order is after analyst agent 1 it is handed off to Agent 2 who in turn hands it 
off to Agent 3 and comes back to Agent 1. 
 Stochasticity. There is randomness in the agent choice at the beginning of the 
simulation to initiate discussion. Then the choice of information by each agent to initiate 
a discussion and also to contribute to the discussion is also stochastic. In the random 
search model, the agent moves a random location to contribute to the discussion. In the 
local search model, the agent moves in an uphill style in the direction of one of the 
relevant information.  
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Observation 
Measures similar to that collected from human-in-the-loop study were also 
collected from the model. The measures are based on the measures used in the hidden 
profile paradigm experiments.  
To measure the agent’s focus of the discussion (Lu, Yuan & McLeod 2012), the 
number of times the agent contributes each piece of attack information was recorded (Xi). 
Then a summation of Xi by each type of attack (shared, unique and isolated) was 
calculated giving the number of times a certain type of attack information was 
contributed to the discussion.  
𝑋𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 =  ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒            (1) 
Where AttackType = {Shared, Unique, Isolated} 
Then a summation of all Xi was calculated which gave the total number of times 
all the attack information pieces was mentioned in the discussion. 
𝑋𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 =  ∑ 𝑋𝑖       (2) 
Then using 𝑋𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 and 𝑋𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙, percentage of shared information mentioned 
(aka Shared Percent) and percentage of unique information mentioned (aka Unique 
Percent) was calculated using the equation 3 and 4. 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 =  
𝑋𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒=𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑∗100
𝑋𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
           (3) 
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 =  
𝑋𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒=𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒∗100
𝑋𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
           (4)  
Finally, the total number of attacks detected by all the agents (aka Detection 
Performance) was also calculated. Because the measurements are conceptually in-line 




To determine the number of model repetitions i.e. the number of samples per 
model, a stability analysis on the model was conducted by running the model in 
increments of 100 repetitions for each model and plotting the cumulative averages of the 
dependent measures: Shared Percentage, Unique Percentage. As shown in Figure 18, the 
model generates stable results around 250 repetitions for shared percent, 700 repetitions 
for unique percent. Therefore the agent based model was run for 1000 repetitions.  
 
Figure 18. Graph of cumulative average of both shared percent measure (left) and unique percent 
measure (right) in all three models. 
Experiment  
Based on the findings from the pretest, the model was run for 1000 repetitions for 
the three search models: Random Search, Local Search and Memory-aided local search. 
Each repetition was run for 15000 ticks or rounds. Macro level performance measures 
such as Total number of attacks detected by all the agents (aka Detection Performance), 
percentage of shared information mentioned (aka Shared Percent) and percentage of 
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unique information mentioned (aka Unique Percent) were collected from each repetition. 
Table 10 gives the list of parameters and  default values. 




Total Number of attacks 13 
Percent of shared attacks 40% 
Percent of unique attacks 15% 
Number of information 
pieces 3 
Type of Search Random 
 
Table 11. Descriptive statistics for each measure in all the three models 
    Search Model Mean Median SD 
Shared 
Percent 
Random 83.5 86.1 14.03 
Local Search 73.4 75.2 13.07 
Memory-aided Local Search 69.2 68.7 11.2 
Unique 
Percent 
Random 15.1 12.6 14.02 
Local Search 23 22.2 13.13 
Memory-aided Local Search 24.4 25.3 10.42 
Detection 
Performance 
Random 3.4 3 1.06 
Local Search 6.5 7 0.6 
Memory-aided Local Search 6.5 7 0.6 
 
Table 11 shows the descriptive statistics for each measure based on the three 
models: Random Search, Local Search and Memory-aided local search. The distribution 
of all three measures from all three models is not-normal and is skewed. Therefore the 
median is a more appropriate measure than mean. The graph in Figure 19 is based on the 
median values for each measure for the three models. As shown in Figure 19, the 
medians are in the predicted direction wherein discussion of shared information in the 
“Memory-Aided Search” model is lesser than “Local Search” model and similarly the 
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discussion of unique information in the “Memory-Aided Search” model is greater than 
“Local Search” model. 
 
Figure 19: Bar chart of measures: Shared percent, Unique Percent and Detection performance in 
terms of median values across all three models 
Because the distribution is not normal, a non-parametric analysis was performed 
on the measures from the model. Kruskal-Wallis, the non-parametric alternative to one-
way ANOVA was employed on the measures. As shown in the Figure 20, the mean rank 
of shared percent in the memory-aided local search model is the lowest whereas the 
mean rank of unique percent in the memory-aided local search model is the highest and 
similarly the mean rank of the performance in both local search and memory-aided local 
search model is the highest. 
Because the sample size is very large, effect sizes are a more accurate measure of 
comparison to investigate the significance of the difference between a pair of models. 
Grissom and Kim (2012) have provided an effect size estimator (like Cohen's d) for use 
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in association with nonparametric statistics which involves Mann-Whitney U statistic, Z-







Figure 20. Bar chart of measures: Shared percent, Unique Percent and Detection performance in 
terms of mean rank across all three models 
As it can be seen in Table 12, the effect size of shared percent between random 
search model and local search model is -0.38 which is a medium effect. The effect size of 
unique percent between random search model and local search model is -0.33 which is 
again a medium effect. The effect size of performance between random search model and 
local search model is -0.87 which is a high effect. 
As it can be seen in Table 12, the effect size of shared percent between random 
search model and memory-aided local search model is -0.51 which is a medium effect. 
The effect size of unique percent between random search model and memory-aided local 
search model is -0.39 which is again a medium effect. The effect size of performance 
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between random search model and memory-aided local search model is -0.86 which is a 
high effect.  
Table 12. Non-parametric effect size for each measure between pairs of models 
 
 
As it can be seen in Table 12, the effect size of shared percent between local 
search and memory-aided local search model is -0.20 which is a low effect. The effect 
size of unique percent between local search and memory-aided local search model is 
0.084 which is a very low. The effect size of performance between local search and 
memory-aided local search model is 0.02 which is a very low effect. 
Summary of Findings 
From the effect size comparison, it can be determined that the random model is 
significantly different from the local search model and memory-aided local search model. 
The percent shared discussion from the local search model is significantly greater than 
percent shared discussion from the memory-aided local search model and the effect size 
statistic also reveals a medium effect. Though Mann-Whitney test revealed a significant 
difference in terms of unique percent discussed between local search model and memory-












Random vs Local -0.38 -0.33 -0.87
Random vs Memory-Aided -0.51 -0.39 -0.86
Local vs Memory-Aided -0.21 -0.08 -0.03
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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: Experiment versus Model 
Measures: shared percent and unique percent from the model have to be compared 
with similar measures obtained from the experiment to make an inference that the local 
search process model is indicative of biased team discussions observed in the experiment 
and that the recognition-based local search process model is indicative of the less-biased 
team discussions observed in the experiment. 
To make such a comparison, the conditions tested in the experiment have to be 
mapped to two groups: Biased condition and less-biased condition. Towards that, as 
shown in Figure 21, all five cells involving slide and wiki software in the experiment 
(represented in yellow) had biased discussion and the one cell for which the participants 
used visualization in their discussion (represented in green) had less-biased model. 
Correspondingly, the local search model is hypothesized to be representative of the 
biased model and the memory-aided local search model is hypothesized to be 
representative of the less-biased model. The random search model is simply the null 
model.  
 
                                             
                      
                                  




No Tool - Slide Based No Tool - Slide Based
No Tool - Slide Based Wiki
No Tool - Slide Based Visualization
Biased Condition Less-biased Condition 







First the distribution of the measures from two experimental conditions were 
compared against the measures from the three models, visually using graphs. Figure 22 
shows the graphs of the data distribution of the shared percent measure from the random 
model (represented in blue) superimposed on shared percent measure from biased 
experimental condition (in grey on left figure) and less-biased experimental condition (in 
grey on right figure). As it can be seen clearly from Figure 22, data from random model 
do not represent the data from the biased or less-biased experimental condition.   
  
 
Figure 22. Shared percent data distribution from random model (in blue) superimposed on biased 
condition (in grey on left figure) and less-biased condition (in grey on right figure) 
Figure 23 shows the graphs of the data distribution of shared percent measure 
from the local search model (represented in blue) superimposed on shared percent 
measure from biased experimental condition (in grey on left figure) and less-biased 
experimental condition (in grey on right figure). As it can be seen from Figure 23, some 
significant area of the data from local search model overlaps with the data from the 
biased experimental condition and does not overlap so much with the data from the less-
biased experimental condition.  





0%     100%  0%      100% 
Figure 23. Shared percent data distribution from local search model (in blue) superimposed on 
biased condition (in grey on left figure) and less-biased condition (in grey on right figure) 
Figure 24 shows the graphs of the data distribution of shared percent measure 
from the memory-aided local search model (represented in blue) superimposed on shared 
percent measure from biased experimental condition (in grey on left figure) and less-
biased experimental condition (in grey on right figure).  
  
      0%          100%       0%       100% 
Figure 24. Shared percent distribution from memory-aided search model (in blue) superimposed 
on biased condition (in grey on left figure) and less-biased condition (in grey on right figure) 
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 As it can be seen from Figure 24, some significant area of the data from local 
search model overlaps with the data from both the biased experimental condition and 
less-biased experimental condition.  
Though such a visual comparison gives some information about the fit between 
the experimental data and the model data, a more standardized analysis is required to 
compare the two distributions to make any concrete claims of similarity between the 
model data and the experimental data. 
Even though the trend of decreasing shared percent between biased and less-
biased condition and increasing unique percent is observed between local search and the 
memory-aided local search model, the distribution of the percentage data from the 
models seems to be shifted from distribution of percentage data from the experiment 
either in the right or the left direction. Hence to make things more clear and standardized, 
a single measure combining the shared and unique percent was calculated and was used 
to compare the experimental data and data from model simulations.  
Magnitude of difference between the shared percent and unique percent is the 
standardized measure used which shows the magnitude of difference between the 
percentage of shared information discussed to unique information discussed and it is 
calculated using the ratio between shared percent and unique percent as shown in the 






 Magnitude of difference was calculated on data from the experimental conditions: 
Biased and Less-Biased and also on data from the three search models: Random, Local 
and Memory-Aided.  
 
Figure 25. Magnitude of difference value for all three models and two experiment conditions 
 
As shown in Figure 25, the magnitude of difference between shared percent and 
unique percent in random is 6.8 which is very high and does not match up to data from 
either conditions. The magnitude of difference in local model is 3.38 and is very similar 
to magnitude of difference in biased model which is 3.78. The magnitude of difference in 
cognitive model is 2.72 and magnitude of difference in less-biased is condition is 1.67. 
Though the decreasing trend observed in less-biased condition is also observed in the 
memory-aided local search condition, it is about 1 unit away from the magnitude of 
difference value in both biased and less-biased condition. Hence a more formal analysis 
needs to be conducted to correctly compare models and the experiment conditions. 
Traditional statistics such as the t-test cannot be employed to compare the results 
from the experiment with the model simulation results because the results from the 
experiment follows a normal distribution with a small sample size, whereas the results 
















Bayesian estimation method was employed to compare the data from the experiment with 
the model to identify the difference/similarity between them. 
Bayesian estimation is an alternative to t-test to compare two groups when the 
distributions are skewed and have different sample sizes (Kruschke 2013). "Bayesian 
estimation for 2 groups provides complete distributions of credible values for the effect 
size, group means and their difference, standard deviations and their difference, and the 
normality of the data" ( Kruschke, 2013, p1). In simple terms, the method generates a 
large set of new values based on the provided input data, computed based on Bayesian 
method, which is credible and not simply resampled as done with traditional statistics. 
The new values are all the possible values generated based on several combinations of 
mean and standard deviations of the input data of both groups being compared. 
Furthermore, Bayesian estimation can also be used to accept the null hypothesis that is 
there is no difference between the groups. 
Therefore Bayesian estimation procedure was first used to compare the 
distributions of magnitude of difference measure between the local search model and 
biased condition. This analysis provided the result as shown in Figure 26. Figure 26 is the 
distribution of mean value difference between local search model and biased condition 
for the magnitude of difference measure. The Bayesian estimation procedure produces a 
distribution of all possible mean values for each group and then takes difference between 
them and then provides a distribution of those difference values. If the distribution 
contains a zero in the 95% high density interval (HDI) of the distribution then it can be 
deduced that there is no difference in their means. In this case the zero slightly misses the 
95% HDI. This mean that distribution of the magnitude difference measure from the 
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biased experiment condition is different from the distribution of the magnitude measure 
from local search model. The mean of this difference distribution is -0.601 and that the 
difference distribution does contain a zero. Hence it can be inferred that local search 
model is somewhat representative of the biased experiment condition 
 
Figure 26. Distribution of mean value difference between local search model and biased 
condition for the magnitude of difference measure. The zero slightly missed 95% HDI interval 
Next the Bayesian estimation procedure was used to compare the distributions of 
magnitude of difference measure between the local search model and the less-biased 
condition. This analysis provided the result as shown in Figure 27. Figure 27 is the 
distribution of mean value difference between local search model and less-biased 
condition for the magnitude of difference measure. In this case the zero misses the 95% 
HDI. This means that distribution of the magnitude difference measure from the less-
biased experiment condition is different from the from local search model. However this 
time the mean of this difference distribution is 1.32. Hence it can be inferred that local 
search model is better representative of the biased experiment condition in comparison to 
the less-biased experiment condition. 
104 
Next the magnitude of difference measure between the memory-aided local search 
model and biased experimental condition was compared. As can be seen in Figure 28, the 
zero is away from the 95% HDI of the mean difference distribution. This means that 
distribution of the magnitude of difference measure from the memory-aided local search 
model is significantly different from the biased experiment condition. The mean of this 
difference distribution is -1.16 
 
Figure 27. Distribution of mean value difference between local search model and less-biased 
condition for the magnitude of difference measure. The zero misses 95% HDI interval 
 
 
Figure 28. Distribution of mean value difference between memory-aided local search model and 
biased condition for the magnitude of difference measure. The zero misses 95% HDI interval 
105 
Finally, the magnitude of difference measure between the memory-aided local 
search model and less-biased experiment condition was compared. As can be seen in 
figure 29, the zero is almost in the 95% HDI of the mean difference distribution. This 
means that distribution of the magnitude of difference measure from the memory-aided 
local search model is representative of the less-biased experiment condition in 
comparison to the biased experiment condition with mean of this difference distribution 
being 0.767. 
 
Figure 29. Distribution of mean value difference between memory-aided local search model and 
less-biased condition for the magnitude of difference measure. The zero is almost in 95% HDI 
interval  
Table 13 shows the mean of the distribution of mean difference of M for the four 
comparisons conducted using the Bayesian estimation method. The two cells highlighted 
in the table contain the value of M for the comparison that was found the most similar 
where the local search model is most representative of the bias experiment condition and 
that memory-aided local search model is the most representative of the less-biased 
condition. 
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Table 13. Table of M values for all the four comparisons made. Cells highlighted has the values 
of the comparisons that revealed most similarity 
 
Summary of findings 
It was found, through visual comparison of the data distributions and through the 
magnitude of difference measure, that data from the random model was not 
representative of either of the experimental conditions: Biased or less-biased. However it 
was found, through a Bayesian estimation procedure on the magnitude of difference 
measure, that data from the local search model were better representative of the data from 
the biased condition in comparison to less-biased experiment condition. Similarly it was 
found that data from the memory-aided local search model were better representative of 
the data from the less-biased experiment condition in comparison to the biased 
experiment condition. It was also observed that data from the agent-based model 
simulation is fairly good representative of the empirical results obtained from the human-
















This dissertation work investigated the presence of the information pooling bias in 
cyber defense analyst teams conducting detection tasks as part of forensics analysis and 
also demonstrated that collaborative visualizations, designed considering human 
cognitive processes, can be effective in minimizing this bias and improving cyber defense 
analyst team performance. Furthermore, agent-based modeling was used to theorize about 
internal cognitive search processes in human analysts that result in such biases during 
their team discussions. 
Results strongly indicate that all the teams who participated in the experiment 
exhibited the bias while performing the detection task by spending a majority of time 
discussing attacks that were also observed by other members of the team, whereas they 
spent a low percentage of time discussing attack that were uniquely available to each 
team member and which were part of a large scale attack. 
Specifically, it was observed that when teams did not receive the visualization during 
their discussion, they discussed shared attack information 63.9% of time which is 3.8 
times higher than the 16.9% of time spent discussing unique attack information. 
However, during Mission 2, when the participant teams in the visualization condition 
used the prototype collaborative visualization, they discussed shared attack information 
only 50.3% of time which is only 1.7 times higher than 30.2% of time spent on 
discussing the unique attack information. This demonstrated a stark increase in the 
amount of time spent discussing the unique pieces of information when the cognitively 
friendly visualization was introduced. However bias was observed to still exist in Mission 
2. 
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These findings strongly show that participant teams demonstrated the information 
pooling bias and this indicate that if forensics analysts collaborate to analyze evidence 
they may also be affected by the information pooling bias as hypothesized (Hypothesis 1) 
in this dissertation. 
Detection performance of the teams was also observed to improve in teams who used 
the tailor-made collaborative visualization tool during their discussions. Teams without 
visualization on an average detected 11 attacks, whereas teams with the visualization on 
an average detected 14 attacks. This improvement in detection performance comes from 
the detection of increased number of unique attacks as opposed to the detection of the 
shared attacks where the average number of shared attacks detected with or without 
visualization remained the same, but the average number of unique attacks that was part 
of a large scale attack detected with visualization was significantly higher than unique 
attacks detected without visualization.  
These findings indicate that the information pooling bias can be minimized (not 
completely mitigated) in cyber defense analyst teams conducting the detection task as 
part of forensics analysis by using tailor-made collaboration tools developed taking into 
consideration the cyber defense analyst’s cognitive requirements as hypothesized 
(Hypothesis 2) in this dissertation.  
A strong positive correlation between the percentage of time spent on discussing 
unique attacks and detection performance was detected whereas a strong negative 
correlation between the percentage of time spent discussing shared attacks and detection 
performance was found. This result indicates that spending more time discussing shared 
information could be detrimental to team performance. It was also found that the 
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percentage of time spent discussing the unique information was a significant predictor of 
the detection performance of cyber defense analyst team. This result confirms the natural 
intuition that bringing into the discussion unique and expert information available to each 
team member could lead to superior team performance. 
The mixed ANOVA analysis revealed a statistically significant interaction effect on 
all three measures: shared percentage, unique percentage and detection performance from 
detecting unique attacks. This means all three measures varied between the two Missions 
as a function of the condition. There was a significant drop in shared percentage in the 
visualization condition between Mission 1 to Mission 2 in comparison to a non-
significant change in shared percentage in slides and wiki condition. Similarly there was 
a significant increase in unique information percentage and detection performance in the 
visualization condition between Mission 1 to Mission 2 in comparison to the 
corresponding non-significant change in slides and wiki condition. Interestingly in 
conditions in which the participant teams used slides or wiki, a slight non-significant 
increase in shared percent was detected in their discussion in Mission 2 which indicated 
of the possibility that even experience in the task may not mitigate this bias in cyber 
defense analyst teams. 
No statistically significant difference was found in amount of shared attack 
information discussed, unique attack information discussed or the detection performance 
among the teams across the three conditions in Mission 1 because all the teams in all 
conditions in Mission 1 used only Microsoft PowerPoint slides during their discussion. 
On the contrary, a statistically significant difference was found in amount of shared 
attack information discussed, unique attack information discussed and the detection 
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performance among the teams in Mission 2 across the three conditions when different 
interventions were employed. Specifically the significant difference in performance 
stemmed from the difference in the number of unique attacks detected.  
No difference between slides and wiki condition across all three measures was 
detected, whereas much of the variance that contributed to the significance came from the 
difference between the slide and visualization condition, and wiki and visualization 
condition across all three measures. These results indicate that using off-the-shelf 
collaboration tools such as the wiki application which is commonly used in the cyber 
defense arena for collaboration is no better than no collaboration tool because it was 
found to be ineffective in reducing information pooling bias and also ineffective in 
improving performance of the team. 
Often visualizations or any new collaborative tools are perceived to cause more 
cognitive load or perceived to be an impedance to the existing work process. The NASA 
TLX workload measures indicate that the participants perceived no significant mental 
load difference between using Microsoft PowerPoint slides or wiki application or the 
prototype collaborative visualization tool. All of the participants perceived the task to be 
moderately hard with average mental work load rated as about seven on the scale of one 
to ten with one meaning no mental load and ten indicating a very high mental load. 
Interestingly a significant variance was detected in participants' perception of the time 
pressure they felt doing the task. The participants in the wiki condition (7.2) rated the 
task to be around one unit more time pressure than participants in the slide (6.2) and 
visualization condition (6.5). The participants in the wiki condition were observed to be 
switching between different pages of attack descriptions during the discussion search for 
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information to contribute which might have contributed to this perception of higher time 
pressure. 
Hence from the results, it can be inferred that when cyber defense analyst conduct 
collaborative detection task as part of forensics, they may be plagued with an information 
pooling bias which prevents the individual members of the team from communicating the 
isolated and unique events which only they observe and resort to repeated communication 
and discussion of the information that is known to everyone on the team. The results 
obtained complement the results found in teams in other domains such as medical teams, 
intelligence analysis and jury teams (Lu, Yuan, & McLeod, 2012; Wittenbaum, 
Hollingshead, & Botero, 2004; Stasser & Titus, 1985). 
Such a biased team discussion could lead to ineffective forensics analyses because 
sometimes integrating the seemingly disparate unique and isolated events could be 
crucial to detecting large scale multi-step attacks such as advanced persistent threats 
(APT). Currently there is a scarcity of methods to proactively detect APTs even though 
the breadcrumbs of the attack emerging in a network are available, observed, and most 
often reported by the analysts. It will be hard to program an expert system to integrate 
such seemingly disparate information and detect an emerging large scale attack because it 
is difficult for the systems to leverage and integrate contextual information. However it is 
possible for the human analyst to incorporate the contextual information to integrate the 
seemingly disparate events that are part of a large scale emerging attack. On the other 
hand, humans have biases and cognitive limitations that prevent them from doing such 
complex integration. Therefore instead of trying to achieve perfectly intelligent experts 
systems to do such tasks and trying to keep the human analysts out of the loop, it would 
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be more effective to leverage human strengths such as contextual-based decision making 
and pattern recognition and alleviating their cognitive limitations through tools that will 
lead to sustained superior performance and at a lower software development cost. 
Past work, investigating this bias in other contexts has mostly explored the social and 
motivational causes of this bias and there is very limited work done on exploring the 
cognitive processes that could be causing this bias (Wittenbaum et al., 2004). It is 
therefore imperative to understand the cognitive processes underlying the bias in order to 
design cognitive-friendly collaboration tools in the cyber defense context. Towards that, 
agent based modelling (ABM) can be used to theorize about the underlying cognitive 
processes. An ABM can be developed to help theorize about the effect of individual 
cognitive processes (coded as rules) on social/team level processes (observed as macro-
level behaviors) (Rajivan, Janssen & Cooke, 2013). Such agent based models were 
developed as part of this dissertation work to theorize about the cognitive search 
processes used in the head of an analyst who is trying to search for information to 
contribute to an ongoing discussion. Cognitive search processes were particularly chosen 
for exploration because they were suspected to be the key component behind the bias 
because if the team members conducted a depth first kind of search, it would lead to a 
tunneled and narrow focused discussion spending most of the time discussing the same 
topic and being myopic about other potential large scale attacks. Hence it was 
hypothesized in that humans, by default, use heuristics based on local search/uphill 
search process to search for information in their memories in order to contribute to the 
ongoing discussion, leading to the information pooling bias. Furthermore, when the 
ongoing topic of discussion does not appear in the current search horizon, it can cause 
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humans to not recognize the presence of the related information in their memory spaces.   
Therefore assistance is needed in the form of visual interventions to stimulate recognition 
memory to help find that relevant information to bring to the discussion. It was also 
hypothesized that visualization used in the experiment aids memory recognition of the 
appropriate information to contribute to the discussion and also information to be avoided 
that is already well discussed, thereby leading to a less biased team discussion and 
improved performance. 
Three search models were developed and explored: Random, Local and Memory-
Aided Local. The random search model was the null model for which agents' do random 
walks in search of information to contribute to the discussion and was developed for 
comparison purposes to evaluate whether the models of interest (local and cognitive) 
were not producing a stochastic behavior. Results indicated that both local search models 
and the memory-aided local search model deviated significantly from the null model 
(random search) and therefore it can be inferred that local and memory-aided local search 
models were not behaving in a random fashion. 
In the local search model, agents conducted local neighborhood search and moved in 
an uphill manner in search of information to contribute to the discussion. In the memory-
aided local search model, agents were aided in finding regions in its memory space where 
it would be possible to find relevant discussion information and once they knew the 
region to examine, they did local/uphill search in that region in search of information to 
contribute to the discussion. The local search model and memory-aided local search 
model were found to deviate significantly from each other in terms of the discussion 
focus measured through shared percent and unique percent measures. It was observed 
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that agents in the local search model spent more time discussing shared information more 
than agents in the memory-aided local search model. Similarly it was observed that 
agents in the local search model spent less time discussing unique information compared 
to agents in the memory-aided local search model.  
The models themselves do not convey much information and hence have to be 
compared with the complementary human-in-the-loop experiment to know if the behavior 
of the agents observed in the local search model was representative of the biased team 
discussion observed in the human-in-the-loop experiment and also to know if the 
behavior of the agents observed in the memory-aided local search model was 
representative of the less-biased team discussion observed in the human-in-the-loop 
experiment. This trend between local search and memory-aided local search in terms of 
discussion focus is in parallel to the trend observed between biased discussion and less-
biased discussion (for which the teams used visualization) in the human-in-the-loop 
experiment. Instead of conducting a comparison based on raw percentage values which 
might lead to making incorrect inferences, a comparison was conducted based on a 
standardized value which was a ratio between the percentage of time spent discussing 
shared information to the percentage of time spent discussing unique information and this 
ratio was called magnitude of difference.  
Bayesian statistics (Kruschke 2013) were used to compare the magnitude of 
difference values from the experiment against the magnitude of difference values from 
the model. Based on the results the local search model was found to be representative of 
the biased discussion observed in the experiment as hypothesized (Hypothesis 3) and that 
memory-aided local search model was found to be representative of the less biased 
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discussion observed in the experiment as hypothesized (Hypothesis 3A). These results are 
particularly insightful because we can now suspect that humans could be using simple 
heuristics and local/uphill kind of search process when they are undergoing such a bias 
and that they could be lacking a global view due to low recognition memory which is 
essential to see the connections between seemingly disparate but associated information. 
Therefore in such contexts, we need tools and visualizations that will enhance human 
search processes and will stimulate their recognition memory which could lead to a more 
global view of the situation at hand. Moreover results from the experiment conducted 
with human subjects could be replicated with an agent-based model by implementing the 
key cognitive aspects of the human subjects.  It was observed that the results closely align 
with the empirical results obtained from the human-in-the-loop experiments as 
hypothesized (Hypothesis 3B).  
Limitations 
The visualization used in the experiment was built strictly for this experiment and 
assumes that the relevant meta-data needed to develop the visualization would be 
available. The experiment was conducted with students with little to no cyber defense 
experience who were trained to perform the synthetic cyber defense and forensics task. 
Therefore, for more ecologically valid results, the experiment needs to be conducted with 
actual cyber forensics teams.  
 This work supports the use of visualization tools that consider human cognitive 
limitations and biases in design.  These can be very effective in improving team 
performance. However the tool built here was built exclusively for the experiment and 
the task designed.. Such a visualization tool could be built by leveraging and mining 
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analyst reports and archived attack reports, so that forensics analysts can effectively 
detect emerging large scale attacks. Usability studies should also be employed to make 
the tool being developed user- and cognitive- friendly. 
Future Directions 
It was observed that some of the participants were strongly holding on to some of their 
pre-conceived theories about the attacks even though other team member deemed them to 
be unlikely and in most cases their pre-conceived theories were indeed incorrect in that 
context. This effect still remained even when other team members provided reasons that 
their theories were incorrect. This has a stark similarity to the confirmation bias seen in 
other domains and may also plague the cyber defense task. Hence it would be worthwhile 
to explore and investigate the confirmation bias in the cyber defense context. 
 It would be interesting to observe and measure how experience working with the 
same team confounds with information pooling bias and also to measure whether the bias 
increases or decreases in the cyber defense context with time and experience. Such a 
study can be done by simply extending this existing study with more scenarios and 
missions and running it as a longitudinal study, measuring the bias at each discussion 
trial. 
 The agent based model was simplistic in terms of the cognitive features coded 
into the agent. Only few key cognitive features were used to construct agents. Therefore 
to make the model more ecologically valid it would be worthwhile to explore how ACT-
R cognitive models can be integrated into agent based modelling methodologies so that 
social/group/team processes emerge from theoretically strong cognitive agent models. 
The existing model also explored only two models of a heuristic search processes. It 
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would be worthwhile to compare experimental data with models on algorithmic search 
processes such as breadth-first search and depth-first search.  
Conclusion 
This dissertation work has multiple implications. Foremost, this dissertation work 
contributes to the knowledge about of the science of team-based cyber defense which is 
severely limited. Specifically, this work contributes insights on plausible cyber defense 
analysts’ biases when they share information with each other. The dissertation was 
carried out using a combination of a human-in-the-loop experiment, agent-based 
modeling, and software prototyping to investigate team cognition in cyber defense and 
therefore demonstrate how such a multi-faceted, multidisciplinary approach is effective 
and insightful for team cognition research. The collaboration software prototyping was 
done from a cognitive standpoint considering human strengths and limitations. This 
demonstrates the advantage of developing tools using a cognitive engineering approach 
to mitigate the human operator’s cognitive limitations. Finally, this work is a 
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In this appendix, only the content from the training presentation is presented. 
 
Background Information 
Cyber security is a serious national threat in the modern era. 
This research is in collaboration with the federal government working to improve the 
overall efficiency of the national cyber security response system. 
 
Hello ! 
In this training module, you will learn:  
The basic concepts of Computer Networks 
About Cyber Attacks 
Types of Cyber Attacks 
And how to discuss and analyze cyber attacks as a team 
 
Learning Objectives 
Become familiar with computer networks and its terminologies 
Get an understanding on how an attacker/hacker can attack computer networks 
Learn how to discuss attacks with others on your team to get a big picture view of the 
network you will be analyzing. 
 
Computer Networks 
The internet is a vast network of computers. It connects billions of computer systems 
distributed world wide. This is a public network (accessible to anyone).  
Every organization has its own private network of computers for its own purposes 
And such individual private networks are connected via the Internet (public) 
There is a lot of information exchanged in these networks and they contribute to network 
traffic 
 
The Computer Network 
A computer network is simply a collection of computers connected together  
Computer networks allows information exchange 
A network can connect different kinds of computers 
Personal computers 
Computer Servers – file server, website server 
Gateways & Routers 
A network is often large and hence divided into several pieces for easy management, 




What is done to make it easy to manage a large network? 
Shut down low priority computers 
Divide a network in to sub-networks 
Connect every computer with each other 
Nothing can be done 
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IP Address 
Each computer device in a network is identified using a standard address called an IP 
address 
It is simply a string of numbers separated by periods 
EX: 74.125.224.179 
This is the IP address of a Google’s server 
Anything that begins with 74.X.X.X belongs to Google 
… 
Another example relevant to the current study is an IP address that begins with 
185.X.X.X This information will be important to you later on as this is the IP address of 
the organization you are going to defend. 
Port 
Port as the name suggests is the outlet for transmitting information. 
A unique port number will be used by software programs to communicate with other 
devices.  
Ports are used by software programs to send information, request information, etc. 
They are usually represented by two or four digit numbers EX: 80, 64, 8081, 8084 
Backdoor: ports used by computers/programs outside the private network to illegally 
access a computer/software. 
Quiz Time 
Question 2 






Types of computer devices 
Personal computers 
The most common kind used for personal computing purposes (Low 
performance) EX: Desktops, laptops. 
Networking Devices 
Routers: Helps in correctly routing the computer data to the intended destination. 
Like Google map application but for networks 
Gateway: As the name indicates, it is the machine that controls computer traffic to 
and from a private network. It’s the end point of a private network. 
 
Computer Server 
As the name indicates it serves requests from other computers (High performance). Not 
for personal computing. 
WebServer: Runs programs that renders websites on request. 
Database Server: Responds to requests from webserver for retrieving stored data 
File server/Data Server: For storing all private files. Responds to request to retrieve a 
certain file. 
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How does information sent from software reach the network for transmission? 
Sent via port 
Sent via gateway 
Sent directly in to the network 
Sent via router 
 
Network Map 
A private network is often represented using a network diagram / map for easy 
understanding of how the different machines are connected with each other 
It will show the different computer devices in the network, its connections along with its 
unique IP address 
Remember your organization will have an IP address beginning with 185.X.X.X 
It will also represent the subnetworks (pieces of networks) using definite boundaries 
encapsulating each piece of the network. 
 
Network Map 
Now lets take a look at the network map of the organization you are going to defend 
today. 
 
You are going to observe attacks from sub-net 2 
(Others in team wont be seeing attacks from this sub-net) 
 
Your Computer Network Map 
The whole Network 
Your Computer Network Map 
Your Computer Network Map 
Your Computer Network Map 
Your Computer Network Map 
To Do 
Go back to the previous slide, and identify the following: 
Internet 
Servers accessible via internet 
Servers accessible internally 




There are rules and restriction on how the computers in public and private networks can 
access and exchange information.  
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However hackers/cyber attackers (The bad guys !) circumvent these rules and regulations 




Cyber attacks can originate from an external location or can sometimes originate from 
inside the organization (aka insider attack) 
The attackers exploit security gaps, holes in software programs or use rogue software 
(aka malware) to launch attacks on computer devices. 
 
Cyber Analyst 
Cyber analysts are personnel who are constantly defending our computer networks from 
such hackers/attackers 
They are like police/warriors of the Internet 
In this experiment you are going to be a cyber analyst 
They monitor pieces of networks (sub-networks) using special software programs to 
detect and respond to cyber attacks 
 
Real world Cyber Analyst 
Computer Virus (Malware) 
Malware, short for malicious software, is any software used to disrupt computer 
operation, gather sensitive information, or gain access to private computer systems.   
Malware is a general term used to refer to hostile or intrusive software. 
Software & its vulnerabilities 
When large complex software programs are developed it is very common that some parts 
of it are not well tested for security flaws. 
Those are identified by hackers to exploit the program and instruct it to do unexpected 
things such as 
Retrieve sensitive information 
Create fake authorized users in the computers 
Create rogue connections from that device to an unknown location and exfiltrate 
sensitive information 











What do hackers do when they discover a vulnerability in the software? 
Reports the vulnerability 
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Exploits the vulnerability 
Does nothing 
Fixes the vulnerability 
 
Type of Attacks 
Type of Attacks 
Now lets look at different types of attacks used by hackers/attackers 
For each attack type we will see: 
What the attack means 
Method of attack 
And what is achieved through the attack 
 
Suspicious Email Message 
Email message will be sent to the employees of the organization with: 
Malicious web links to steal information 
Malicious attachments (such as malware) to gain access to private network or 
disrupt the computer 
Email asks to visit a fake or modified website to also steal information 
Malicious emails can be just an isolated attack for stealing personal or financial 
information 
Or it could be the first step to a large scale attack 
 
Remote Login Attempt 
An attacker tries to gain access to an internal system from a remote location.  
Method: 
Attacker uses brute force method to gain access to a private machine 
Attacker will enter several usernames and passwords until they succeed.  
Gaining access to a machine in a private network can lead to large scale attacks 
 
Connection to an Unknown Host 
A machine from within the company is trying to establish an unauthorized connection to 
a remote suspicious location 
Method: 
After gaining access to a machine, attackers create backdoor ports  
Through these backdoor ports they establish connections to a remote location 
And would transfer confidential information via the unauthorized connection to 
the remote location 
File Access Attempt 
Someone was trying to access or modify an important file. 
 
Method: 
Hacker gains access to a machines and attempts to modify one or more files in 
that machine 
Modifying the contents of document type files can lead to loss of important 
information 
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Modifying the contents of software files can lead to malicious behavior  
Note: Some of these attacks fail because the files are locked for modification and 
the contents of the file can only be read (aka read-only) 
Buffer Overflow Attempt 
Buffer is a type of computer memory 
Method: 
A vulnerable software program can sometimes be modified to overflow the 
memory allocated  
Through memory overflow the program can instruct the machine to do 
undesirable things 
Simple buffer overflow can lead to computer crashing 
But sometimes the overflow can cause new programs to be executed which can lead to 
creating fake users, modifying files, etc. 
 
Possible Malware 
Malware is software used to disrupt computer operation, gather sensitive information, or 
gain access to private computer systems. 
Method: 
Installed via email attachment 
Transferred via USB drive 
Or embedded within another program or file 
 
Malware behavior varies vastly. And most them are very disruptive. 
Information Request Query 
Hacker is trying to get information about a network, system, or software to initiate an 
attack. 
Hackers use this kind of simple attacks to get information about the private computers 
and network 
It is a kind of reconnaissance 
They use the information to develop attacks later 
Method: 
Sends request to network devices to return information about its network  
 
Possible Information Leak 
A file, message or data which could be sensitive to the organization is exfiltrated from the 
company’s private network. 
Method: 
After gaining access to a machine the attacker can transfer information through a 
variety of techniques (such as back door) 
 
Loosing confidential information means losing intellectual property, national secrets, etc. 
Loosing financial information can cause financial loss 
 
Port Scan Attempt 
The process of checking every port on a computer 
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It is used by hackers  
To identify open ports to gain access 
Learn about the software using the different ports to identify vulnerable software 
running in the machine 
Method: 
Hackers scan the computer networks to identify soft spots in the network 
If a port is open they could try gaining access to the machine 
Similarly they can identify vulnerable software to exploit by scanning the ports 
DDOS 
DDOS or distributed denial of service attack. One hacker or a group of hackers can send 
tons of traffic from a lot of machines to bring down a particular service or a machine. 
 
Why is it an attack: 
This is often used to disrupting a service or a computer 
Disrupting essential services can be disastrous 
Disrupting websites can be a loss to the company 
Disrupting Army networks can handicap the security of a nation 
 
“Ping” is a data packet that is often exploited in this attack. “Ping” is used to determine if 
a remote computer is powered ‘on’ or ‘off’ 
Quiz Time 
Question 6 
An attacker is trying out several usernames and passwords on a system. Why ? 
To get information about the machine 
To gain remote access to the machine 
To transfer a file to the machine 




Attacker created an unknown user name with high privileges on a private machine. How 
? 
By installing a malware  
By sending a suspicious email 
By a buffer overflow attack 




How can an attacker send a sensitive file from a private machine to a remote location? 
Using a software port 
Using a backdoor port 
Using an unauthorized connection 
All of the above 
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Cyber Report and Attack Observations  
Cyber Reports 
A cyber report is a collection of attacks observed by one cyber analyst from one sub-
network. 
 
In each team there are 3 cyber defense analysts and hence there will be 3 different reports 
of cyber attacks which have to be discussed and analyzed. 
 
Attack Observation 
An attack observation is the description of the attack observed in a particular sub-
network. 
 
Each attack observation in a report will have descriptions of  
Time of attack 
Details of source (IP address, Port) of attack 
Details of the machine (IP address) being attacked 
Type of attack 
Attack process description 
Details of any immediate response taken 
 
Example Attack Observation 
Time of attack: 9Am 10 April 2014 
Source IP: 152.160.160.12  
Destination IP: 185.10.10.34 (Employee machine)  (Subnet 1) 
Type of attack: Intrusion attempt/port scan 
Unauthorized access to an employee machine (185.10.10.34) through a open port that 
allows remote access 
Open port that allows remote access was detected  
Open port allowed remote access to the aerielview service  
Accessed from a remote host 152.160.160.12  




As described before, reports contain attack observations from each sub-network. 
But attacks identified from the individual sub-networks need to be further analyzed to 
identify if they are part of any large scale attacks and are not just isolated events. 
Such an analysis will give a big picture view of the network 
 
Isolated Attacks 
Isolated attacks are attacks that are targeted at only one machine in one sub network  
They are often less damaging 
 
Large scale attacks involve attacks happening on different parts of the network launched 
by the same attacker/ group of attackers 
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Large scale attack are usually of three kinds: 
Same type of attacks from same source occurring at different parts of the network 
Same attacks at different sub-net 
Same attacks at different locations 
 
Large scale attacks 
Large scale attacks involve attacks happening on different parts of the network launched 
by the same attacker/ group of attackers 
Large scale attack are usually of three kinds: 
Same type of attacks from same source occurring at different parts of the network 
Attack migrating from one part of the network to the other by using different 
exploits and attacks 
Attacks migrating at a very slow pace (Stealth attacks) 
 
Large scale attacks 
Large scale attacks often lead to dire consequences. Few Examples: 
Heavy loss (Ex: Cyber attack on Target which lead to large financial loss and 
defacement) 
Large scale disaster (Iranian Nuclear Plant attack – Was deemed as the first 
indication of cyber warfare) 
Therefore it is very important to detect the presence of large scale attacks in one’s 
network 
 
Detecting Large scale attacks 
Detecting large scale attacks is difficult 
They often look as isolated events to the analyst looking at only one part of the network 
However there will be subtle evidence in these seemingly isolated events that will 
indicate they are connected and that are part of a large scale attack. 
Hence effective information sharing between analysts is necessary to see the big picture 
view of the attack 
 
Detecting Large scale attacks 
Detecting large scale attacks require team effort  
Requires extensive discussion about each attack observed by each analyst 
Each analyst describes the attack to the rest of team to help in finding the clues that 
indicates connections between different attack observations 
Requires “Connecting the dots” effort 
It’s like solving a puzzle ! 
 
Cues to discover Large scale attack 
There will be pieces of information in each observation that indicates similarity to 
observations in other team members reports 
 
Sample cues 
Similarities could be based on the following  
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Same source IP address   
Same type of attack (Ex: Intrusion)      
Similar time of attack (Ex 9:00Am)      
Similar attack method       
Information type / Files involved in the attack 
Port number (Ex: 8081)     




Example – same attack at different locations 
Unknown remote access to an employee machine (185.10.10.34) through a port that 
allows remote access 
Open port that allows remote access was detected  
Open port allowed remote access to the aerielview service  
Accessed from a remote host 152.160.160.12  
Aerielview service shut down in response  
----------- 
Type of attack Intrusion attempt/port scan 










Which of the following information can be used to identify similarities between reports ? 
File involved in the attack 
Time of attack 
Port number used in the attack 




A large scale attack is  
Attack migrating from one machine to other 
Same kind of attack on several machines 
Attack migrating at a slow pace 
Same attack on the same machine over several days 
Only 1,2,and 3 




Before Discussion – Reading Report 
You are expected to read and understand the information present in the report handed to 
you during the reading time. 
The training provided will help you to understand the material 
During Discussion –  
Pick and Describe 
Take turns and describe each attack from the report you read to your team members 
Pick an attack observation of your choice 
Describe the attack in overall 
Specify the source of the attack (IP address, machine name) 
Specify the machine being attacked 
Say the time of attack 
And describe how the attacker carried out the attack 
 
Example – same attack at different locations 
Unknown remote access to an employee machine (185.10.10.34) through a port that 
allows remote access 
Open port that allows remote access was detected  
Open port allowed remote access to the aerielview service  
Accessed from a remote host 152.160.160.12  
Aerielview service shut down in response  
 
During Discussion - Listen 
When your team member is describing the attack 
Listen Keenly 
Look for cues which might indicate some connection 
Discuss further and make the connections between the individual attacks. 
 
Remember 
You wont be able to discover the large scale attacks by simply reading out the 
information 




Lead an effective discussion 
Find the Attacks 
Report the Attacks 
Save the day ! 
 
Your Goals 
Discuss all your individual observations thoroughly with your team members 
Identify the large scale attacks  




ATTACK REPORTS PRESENTED TO PARTICIPANTS 
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Mission 1Attack Evidences 
Uncertified Software 
Time of Attack: 3Am April 10 2014 
Source IP: 158.97.97.204 
Destination IP: 185.10.10.25 
Type of attack Uncertified Software Installed 
An uncertified software was installed on an employee machine with IP: 185.10.10.25 
Details: 
A software called "Corpusrecorder" was installed  
Source of software: corpusrecorder.com (unverified site)  
Antivirus reported it as suspicious and quarantined it  
 
Malware/Mail 
Time of Attack: 0934Am on April 10 2014 
Source IP: 110.10.10.15  
Destination IP: 185.10.10.201 
Type of attack: Malware/Mail 
A malware was detected in an employee machine 
Details: 
An employee (in managerial level) reported her desktop to have slowed down 
after downloading an email attachment called “stuxcom”.  
A malware was detected in that attachment .  
The malware was later quarantined  
 
Port Scan 
Time of Attack: 10Am April 10 2014 
Source IP: 175.15.10.10  
Destination IP: 185.10.10.X (all machines) 
Type of Attack: Port Scan 
A remote host (175.15.10.10) performed a port scan on all the desktop machines 
Details: 




Time of Attack: 1025Am April 10 2014 
Source IP: 185.10.10.45 
Destination IP: 165.165.165.15   
Type of attack: Information Leak 
Information leak to a known rogue location 165.165.165.15 has been detected. 
Details: 
A port was opened by a software called "b2reader" (seems like a rogue software).  
Then an unauthorized connection to 165.165.165.15 was created 




Time of Attack: 1115Am on April 10 2014 
Source IP: 185.20.20.4 
Destination IP: 185.10.10.14  
Type of attack: Malware 
Trojan detected on an employee machine (185.10.10.14).  
Connection to the shared file server (185.20.20.4) from a local system (185.10.10.14) at 
1115Am on April 10 2014.  
A file called "breakpics.pdf" was downloaded from the file server (185.20.20.4)   
File breakpics.pdf was detected to contain a trojan  
Trojan quarantined  
 
Malware 
Time of Attack: 3Pm April 10 2014 
Source IP: 165.165.165.12  
Destination IP: 185.10.10.X  
Type of attack: Malware 
Employees of the organization received a malware from an email message.  
Details: 
The email was received from a blacklisted IP address 165.165.165.12 at 3pm on 
April 10 2014.  
There was an attachment called "Fox.vid".  
The software had an embedded malware which tried to install itself in the 
background.  
Anti-virus quarantined it. 
 
Privilege Escalation 
Time of Attack: 3pm on April 10 2014. 
Source IP: 172.15.15.10 
Destination IP: 185.10.10.3 
Type of attack: Privilege Escalation / Buffer Overflow 
A remote machine (172.15.15.10) gained admin privileges on a local machine. 
Details:  
The attacker used port scan and found a vulnerable service called "syshost.exe".  
Then launched a buffer overflow on "syshost.exe" 
This lead to the creation of new user with admin privileges in the machine.  
The user was deleted in response. 
 
DDOS 
Time of Attack: 5Pm April 10 2014 
Source IP: 24.56.56.9-20  
Destination IP: 185.10.10.X  
Type of attack: Denial of Service 
Several of our employer systems faced a denial of service attack at 5pm (April 10 2014).  
Details: 
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The attack originated from rogue machines in the IP range 24.56.56.9-20 
A flood of ping requests on an open port caused the attack.  
Lead the systems to be unresponsive for several hours.  
End of Report 
 
Intrusion/local 
Time of Attack: 0945Am April 10 2014 
Source IP: 185.10.10.201  
Destination IP: 185.20.20.3  
Type of attack: Intrusion / File transfer 
An unauthorized Intrusion from a local user machine was detected on the Internal server  
Details: 
User has no authorization to access the Internal Server  
A file called "stuxcom“ was transferred from local machine 185.10.10.201 To 
internal server 185.20.20.3  
The "stuxcom" program opened a port number 4522 on the web server 
Port was closed after detection  
 
Privilege Escalation 
Time of Attack: 1015Am on April 10 2014 
Source IP: 172.15.15.20 
Destination IP: 185.20.20.4 
Type of attack Privilege Escalation 
A remote machine (172.15.15.10) gained admin privileges on the file server 
Details 
The attacker used port scan and found a vulnerable service called "syshost.exe".  
Then launched a buffer overflow on "syshost.exe" 
This lead to the creation of new user with admin privileges in the machine.  
The user was deleted in response. 
 
Unknown Connection 
Time of Attack: 1103Am on April 10 2014.14 
Source IP: 185.30.30.4  
Destination IP: 185.20.20.4  
Type of attack: Unknown Connection 
An unauthorized connection from a database server was detected on the file server 
(185.20.20.4) 
Details: 
Database server (185.30.30.4) established an unauthorized remote connection to 
the shared file server (185.20.20.4). 
Connection was established via port 8081  
Then a file called "breakpics.pdf" was copied to the file server through this 





Time of Attack: 1130Am on April 10 2014 
Source IP: 156.156.156.10  
Destination IP: 185.20.20.4 
A brute force intrusion was attempted on the file server.  
Details: 
Remote machine tried to gain access on the file server using several login 
attempts using different usernames and passwords.  
Successfully gained access using login id "admin" and "password" combination  
Using the login a scan on the files in the system was initiated . The scan was 
stopped in response . 
 
Malware 
Time of Attack: 3Pm April 10 2014 
Source IP: 165.165.165.12 
Destination IP: 185.10.10.X  
An email message with a malware attachment was detected. The message was sent from a 
blacklisted IP address 165.165.165.12 at 3pm on April 10 2014.  
Details: 
The email message was targeted to just our employees.  
It came with an attachment called "Fox.vid".  
The software had an embedded malware which tried to install itself in the 
background.  
Anti-virus quarantined it.    
 
File Access 
Time of Attack: 3:30Pm April 10 2014 
Source IP: 76.15.245.12  
Destination IP: 185.20.20.2  
Type of attack: File Access 
File on the database server was attempted to be edited  
Details: 
File name root/security/sam.ph  
The file has software program to get username and password from the server 
 File was locked for any modification. No known damage was done    
 
DDOS 
Time of Attack: 5pm April 10 2014 
Source IP: 24.56.56.9-20 
Destination IP: 185.20.20.4  
Type of attack: Denial of Service 
Rogue machines in the range 24.56.56.9-20 launched a denial of service attack on the 
Internal Database server.  
Details: 
A flood of ping requests on our internal Database Server was detected 
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Time of Attack: 0630Pm April 10 2014 
Source IP: 225.153.160.62  
Destination IP: 185.30.30.1  
Type of attack: Information Request Query 
A remote machine requested IP information about all internal server machines 
Details: 
A request from 225.153.160.62 to the gateway router to return IP table 
information about the internal servers 
Request from 225.153.160.62 to conduct port scan  
IP table was returned but port scan request denied  
End of Report 
 
Intrusion/Net 
Time of Attack: 8Am April 10 2014 
Source IP: 156.156.156.10  
Destination IP: 185.30.30.1  
Type of attack: Intrusion / Network scan 
A brute force intrusion on the gateway machine was detected.  
Details: 
Remote machine tried to gain access on the gateway machine through several 
login attempts using different usernames and passwords.  
Successful gained access using the login id "admin" and password "password" 
combination.  
Using the login, the hacker tried to scan the network.    
 
Privilege Escalation 
Time of Attack: 10Am on April 10 2014  
Source IP: 185.20.20.3  
Destination IP: 185.30.30.4  
Type of attack: Privilege Escalation / Buffer Overflow 
The internal server (185.20.20.3) gained admin privileges on the database master server 
(185.30.30.4) 
Details: 
Several failed connections from 185.20.20.3 (via Port number:4522)  
Led to buffer Overflow on the login service on Database server  
A new User added on the database server due to buffer overflow 
 
Information Leak 
Time of Attack: 1017Am April 10 2014 
Source IP: 185.30.30.3 
Destination IP: 165.165.165.15 
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Type of attack Information Leak 
Information leak to a remote location with IP: 165.165.165.15 has been detected. 
Details: 
Port 5621 was opened by a software called "b2reader“  
Then a connection was established to 165.165.165.15 using the port 5621. 
Then a file named "pass.txt" was transferred over this established connection   
 
Suspicious connection 
Time of Attack: 11Am April 10 2014 
Source IP: 185.30.30.4  
Destination IP: 185.20.20.4 
A suspicious connection from the database server 185.30.30.4 was observed on the File 
server 185.20.20.4 
Details: 
A file from an unknown source (possibly from a USB stick) was installed on the 
database server 185.30.30.4.  
This software installation caused a buffer overflow 
Later a new user was created  
The new user opened a back door port 8081  
A new Connection attempted via back door 8081 to the shared file server 
(185.20.20.4).  
The user and the connection deleted on detection 
 
File Access 
Time of Attack: 3Pm April 10 2014 
Source IP: 40.40.40.12  
Destination IP: 185.30.30.3  
Type of attack: File Access 
A remote user attempted to modify a read-only file on the webserver 185.30.30.3.  
Details: 
A remote machine (40.40.40.12) repeatedly attempted to modify a read only file 
"web.config".  
The attempt was unsuccessful   
 
Malware 
Time of Attack: 3Pm April 10 2014 
Source IP: 165.165.165.12  
Destination IP: 185.10.10.X  
Our employees received a harmful email message from a blacklisted IP address 
165.165.165.12.  
Details: 
A Suspicious email message with attachment called "Fox.vid" was received by 
our employees 
The software had an embedded malware which tried to install itself in the 
background.  
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It was detected by antivirus and was defended.   
 
DDOS 
Time of Attack: 5Pm April 10 2014 
Source IP: 24.56.56.9-20  
Destination IP: 185.30.30.1  
Type of attack: Denial of Service 
Rogue machines (in IP range 24.56.56.9-20) launched a denial of service attack on our 
gateway system (185.30.30.1).  
Details: 
A flood of ping requests on the border gateway system (185.30.30.1) was 
detected.  
Response: Configured the router to drop the requests from the IP 24.56.56.9-20 
 
DDOS 
Time of Attack: 8Pm April 10 2014 
Source IP: 125.125.10.10-25  
Destination IP: 185.30.30.2  
Type of attack: Denial of Service (DDOS) 
A series of remote machines (in IP range from 125.125.10.10 to 125.10.10.25) launched a 
denial of service attack on the load balancer 185.30.30.2 
Details: 
A flood of ping connections was sent to load balancer system 
But  the pings were rejected by the router 
End of Report 
 
Mission 2 Attack Evidences 
Intrusion 
Time of Attack 9Am April 11 2014  
Source IP 154.48.48.48  
Destination IP 185.X.X.X  
Type of Attack Intrusion  
A brute force intrusion from a remote IP - 154.48.48.48 was detected on different 
machines on the network.  
Several failed login failures was observed. The remote machine tried to gain access 
through several logins.  
On further investigation, it was found that the remote system was successful in logging in 
to a router machine. Used the login id - "admin" and password- "starwars123".  
Using the login, the attacker tried to copy the address tables in the router – Possibly to 
hop to other machines in the network.  
Login ID and password was changed in response 
 
Information Request Query 
Time of attack 9:30Am April 11 2014  
Source IP 128.128.128.15  
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Destination IP 185.30.30.1  
Type of attack Suspicious Information Request Query  
An unauthorized request to send IP addresses and port numbers of all systems in the 
network was detected  
Unauthorized Source IP (128.128.128.15)  




Time of Attack 9:45Am April 11 2014  
Source 135.128.128.10  
Destination 185.20.20.4 & 185.20.20.2  
Type of attack Port Scan  
File server and the internal database server in the sub-network was port scanned by a 
remote machine 135.128.128.10  
Port scan was to identify all the systems running bingbar service 
 
Uncertified Software 
Time of Attack 11Am April 11 2014  
Source IP Unknown  
Destination IP 185.30.30.1  
Type of attack uncertified software installed  
An unknown software was installed on the gateway machine  
Software called "confikergetter.exe" was installed. 
 
Memory Corrupt 
Time of Attack 12:15Pm April 11 2014  
Source IP 175.45.65.65  
Destination IP 185.30.20.3  
Type of attack Memory Corrupted  
Memory on the system was corrupted due to a suspicious script.  
Found Script data on the system fdskdskhsdkhfdhfdshfkddskkdskd <script type 
textjavascript> function ex() for(i = 0; i<0; i++) ( buffer2 += buffer; ) document.title = 
buffer2; ) <script>sfdsdhdhsdkhfsdfhk 
 
Malware 
Time of Attack 2pm April 11 2014  
Source IP Unknown  
Destination IP 185.30.30.1  
Type of attack Malware Software  
Possible malware was detected by anti-virus on the gateway machine (185.30.30.1).  
Name of the of malware software – "adzap"  





Time of Attack 4:15pm April 11 2014  
Source IP 185.30.30.3  
Type of attack Connection Redirect  
All web requests to the main website file (aka the landing page) is being redirected to 
another page called "newlanding.html"  
Webserver (185.30.30.3) machine was overloaded due to the several redirects  
The redirects was later observed to have ended 
 
Buffer Overflow 
Time of Attack 1130pm April 11 2014  
Source IP Unknown  
Destination IP 185.30.30.1  
Type of attack Buffer Overflow  
A Buffer Overflow on the gateway machine (185.30.30.1) was detected.  
It lead to the creation of a new user.  
New user’s login id "trackme" password "startrekfan"  
The buffer overflow vulnerability was later patched and the new user created was 
removed in response 
 
Intrusion 
Time of Attack 9Am April 11 2014  
Source IP 154.48.48.48  
Destination IP 185.20.20.4  
Type of Attack Intrusion  
A brute force intrusion from a remote IP - 154.48.48.48 was detected on the file server.  
Several failed login failures was observed. The remote machine tried to gain access 
through several logins.  
On further investigation, it was found that the remote system was successful in logging in 
to file server. Used the login id - "admin" and password- "starwars123".  
Using the login, the attacker tried to modify the files.  
Login ID and password was changed in response 
 
Port Scan 
Time of Attack 9:45Am April 11 2014  
Source 135.128.128.10  
Destination 185.X.X.X  
Type of attack Port Scan  
Several machines in the sub-network was port scanned by a remote machine 
135.128.128.10  
Port scan was to identify all the systems running bingbar service 
 
Intrusion 
Time of Attack 9:55Am April 11 2014  
Source IP 152.160.160.12  
152 
Destination IP 185.20.20.3  
Type of attack Intrusion attempt/port scan  
An unknown remote access to the internal server (185.20.20.3) using an open port was 
detected.  
The open port allowed remote access to the aerielview service  
The Aerielview service was shut down in response 
 
Port Scan 
Time of Attack 9:57Am April 11 2014  
Source IP 145.138.138.10  
Destination IP 185.20.20.X  
Type of attack Port scan  
Several machines in the subnet was scanned by 145.138.138.10.  
The attacker was looking for the service “Aerielview” 
 
Uncertified Software 
Time of Attack 11Am April 11 2014  
Source IP USB Drive 
Destination IP 185.20.20.2  
Type of attack uncertified software installed  
An unknown software was installed on the database machine  
Software called "confikergetter.exe" was installed. 
 
Unknown Connection 
Time of Attack 11Am April 11 2014  
Source IP 185.20.20.3  
Destination Machine 172.132.132.12-25  
Type of attack Unknown Remote Connection  
Detected several unauthorized connection requests to remote hosts in the ip range 
172.132.132.12-25.  
Connections were not established 
 
File Access 
Time of Attack 4:00pm April 11 2014  
Source IP 185.10.10.21  
Destination IP 185.30.30.3  
Type of attack File Integrity  
A file on the web server (185.30.30.3) was modified  
Configuration file "web.config" was modified by an internal user (from ip 185.10.10.21)  
Change made to file is untraceable  
In addition to the change, a new file was also added to the webserver (185.30.30.3) – 
New file name "newlanding.html"  
 
File Access 
Time of Attack 1140Pm April 11 2014  
153 
Source of Attack 185.30.30.1  
Destination IP 185.30.30.3  
Type of attack File Integrity  
The main file (aka the landing page) of the organization’s website was modified on the 
webserver.  
The user modified the page logging in from the gateway machine (185.30.30.1)  
login \"trackme\" password \"startrekfan\"  
The "Default.html" file on the website was found to be modified 
Intrusion 
Time of Attack 9Am April 11 2014  
Source IP 154.48.48.48  
Destination IP 185.20.20.4  
Type of Attack Intrusion  
A brute force intrusion from a remote IP - 154.48.48.48 was detected on the file server.  
Several failed login failures was observed. The remote machine tried to gain access 
through several logins.  
Especially the login id "admin" and password- "starwars123" was attempted  
No machines were compromised 
 
Port Scan 
Time of Attack 9:45Am April 11 2014  
Source 135.128.128.10  
Destination 185.10.10.X  
Type of attack Port Scan  
Several machines in the sub-network was port scanned by a remote machine 
135.128.128.10  
Port scan was to identify all the systems running bingbar service 
 
Unknown Connection 
Time of Attack 11Am April 11 2014  
Source IP 185.10.10.X  
Destination Machine 172.132.132.12-25  
Type of attack Unknown Remote Connection  
Detected several unauthorized connection requests from several machines to remote hosts 
in the IP range 172.132.132.12-25.  
Connections were not established 
 
Memory Corrupt 
Time of Attack 12:15Pm April 11 2014  
Source IP 175.45.65.65  
Destination IP 185.10.10.4 
Type of attack Memory Corrupted  
Memory on the system was corrupted due to a suspicious script.  
Found Script data on the system fdskdskhsdkhfdhfdshfkddskkdskd  
<script type textjavascript> function ex() for(i = 0; i<0; i++) ( buffer2 += buffer; )  
154 
document.title = buffer2; ) <script>sfdsdhdhsdkhfsdfhk 
 
Suspicious Email 
Time of Attack 3pm on April 11 2014  
Source IP 165.165.165.12  
Destination IP 185.10.10.X  
Type of attack Suspicious Email/Phishing  
A possible phishing  email message was detected.  
The message was sent from a blacklisted IP address:165.165.165.12  
The email message was targeted to just our employees.  
The message contains a link to bank of America requesting login information 
 
Unauthorized Transfer 
Time of Attack 4:20pm April 11 2014  
Source IP 185.30.30.4  
Destination IP 185.10.10.21  
Type of attack Unauthorized information transfer  
Unauthorized user Information was transferred from the database server (185.30.30.4) to 
a local machine (185.10.10.21)  
This occurs when users access the webpage "newlanding.html"  
It was user information that was transferred to local machine (185.10.10.21)  
Transfer to the local machine is unauthorized 
 
Information Request Query 
Time of Attack 9:30pm April 11 2014  
Source IP - 165.165.165.12  
Destination IP 185.10.10.X  
Type of attack Suspicious Information Request Query 
A Request to send information about all IP addresses of machines in the network was 
received by several machines in the sub-network  
The request was masqueraded as a legitimate request.  
Request flagged as suspicious because it originated from a blacklisted IP  
Request was rejected  in response 
 
Malware/mail 
Time of Attack 9Am on April 12 2014   
Source IP 165.165.165.15  
Destination IP 185.10.10.X  
Type of attack Malware through mail  
Employees received suspicious email messages  
A Suspicious email message with link to their own company’s website ("Default.html") 
and requesting them to accept the new terms and conditions of the site  
A rogue script on the website suspected of exfilterating user information to a remote 
location (165.165.165.15) 
 
